Zurcher v. Stanford Daily by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
To: The Chirtiusrfl1 
Mr. Just'ce B 
Mr . Just S ~w rt 
9~~ 
~~ /...o c:=;,.e~ --~ 
~~~~~·~ 
~~ r 'J- , 1 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
"'11r. Just!_ce Powell 
Mr. JusLice R1hnquis t 
Mr. Just.Lc:e Stevens 
From: Mr. Justice White 
Circulated, ~ 7 
lst DRAFT Recirculated: ------
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 76-1484 AND 76-1600 
James Zurcher, Etc., et al., Petitioners, 
76-1484 v. 
The Stanford Daily et al. 
Louis P. Bergna, District Attorney, 
and Craig Brown, Petitioners, 
76- 1600 v. 
On Writs of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit. 
The Stanford Daily et al. ./.! ,~ ~~~J~ 
[March-, 1978] -~..,..,--y"'-
, ~ 
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. I' ~.L~~ f 
The terms of the Fourth Amendment, applicable to th~~ 
States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, are familiar4 5J  
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers. and effects, against unreasonable searche~ ~ t-o 
and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particuarly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." vr. ~ 
As heretofore understood, the Amendment has not been a ~~ 
barrier to warrants to search property on which there is ' -, --- / 
probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or .J.A _ • ' 
evidence of crime is located, whether or not the owner or '~ c-c... 
possessor of the premises to be searched is himself reasonably d 
suspected of complicity in the crime being investigated. We 
are now asked to reconstrue the Fourth Amendment and to '-i .. ~ i IJ 
hold for the first time that when the place to be searched is .,_.~ 
occupied by a person not then a suspect, a warrant to search ,i _ _ -~~ 
for criminal objects and evidence reasonably believed to be ~
• 
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located there should not issue except in the most unusual 
circumstances, a11d that except in such circumstances, a sub-
poena duces tecum must be relied upon to recover the objects 
or evidence sought. 
I 
Late in the day on Friday. April 9, 1971, officers of the Palo 
Alto Police Department and of the Santa Clara County 
Sheriff's Department responded to a call from the director of 
the Stanford University Hospital requesting the removal of a 
large group of demonstrators who had seized the hospital's 
administrative offices and occupied them since the previous 
afternoon. After several futile efforts to persuade the demon-
strators to leave peacefully, more drastic measures were 
employed. The demonstrators had barricaded the doors at 
both ends of a hall adjacent to the administrative offices. The 
police chose to force their way in at the west end of the 
corridor. As they did so, a group of demonstrators emerged 
through the doors at the east end and, armed with sticks and 
clubs. attacked the group of nine police officers stationed there. 
One officer was knocked to the floor and struck repeatedly on 
the head; another suffered a broken shoulder. All nine were 
injured.1 There were no police photographers at the east 
doors, and most bystanders and reporters were on the west side. 
The officers themselves were able to identify only two of their 
assailants. but one of them did see at least one person photo-
graphing the assault at the east doors. 
On Sunday, Aprilll, a special edition of the Stanford Daily 
(Daily) , a student newspaper published at Stanford Univer-
sity, carried articles and photographs devoted to the hospital 
protest and the violent clash between demonstrators and 
police. The photographs carried the byline of a Daily staff 
member and indicated that he had been at the east end of the 
hospital hallway where he could have photographed the assault 
1 Therf' was extensive damage to the administrative offices resulting from 
the occupation and the removal of the demonstrator&. 
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on the nine officers. The next day, the Santa Clara County 
District Attorney's Office secured a warrant from the munic-
ipal court for an immediate search of the Daily's offices for 
negatives, film and pictures showing the events and occurrences 
at the hospital on the evening of April 9. The warrant issued 
on a finding of "just, probable and reasonable cause for 
believing that: Negatives, photographs, and films, evidence 
material and relevant to the identification of the perpetrators 
of felonies, to wit, Battery on a Peace Officer, and Assault with 
a Deadly W ea.pon, will be located · [on the premises of the 
Daily]." App. 31- 32. The warrant affidavit contained no 
allegation or indication that members of the Daily staff were 
in any way ~nvolved in unlawful acts a.t the hospital. 
The search pursuant to the warrant was conducted later that 
day by four police officers and took place in the presence of 
some members of the Daily staff. The Daily's photographic 
laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, and waste paper baskets were 
searched. Locked drawers and rooms were not opened. The 
offi<;lers apparently had opportunity to read notes and cor-
respondence during the search; but contrary to claims of the 
staff, the officers denied that they had exceeded the limits of 
the warrant.2 They had not been advised by the staff that the 
areas they were searching contained confidential materials. 
The search revealed only the photographs that had already 
been published on April 11 , and no materials were removed 
from the Daily's office. 
A month later the Daily and various members of its staff, 
respondents here, brought a civil action in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 
against the police officers who conducted the search , the chief 
of police, the district attorney and one of his deputies, and the 
judge who had issued the warrant. The complaint alleged 
that the search of the Daily's office had deprived respondents 
2 The District Court did not find it necessary to resolve this dispute. 
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under color of state law of rights secured to them by the First, 
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution. 
The District Court denied the request for an injunction 
but on respondents' motion for summary judgment, granted 
declaratory relief. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 
124 (ND Cal. 1972). The court did not question the existence 
of probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed 
and to believe that relevant evidence would be found on the 
Daily's premises. It held, however, that the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments forbade the issuance of a warrant to 
search for materials in possession of one not suspected of crime 
unless there is probable cause to believe, based on facts pre-
sented in a sworn affidavit, that a subpoena duces tecum 
would be impracticable. Further, the failure to honor a 
sqbpoena would not alone justify a warrant; it must also 
appear that the possessor of the objects sought would disregard 
a court order not to remove or destroy them. The District 
Court further held that where the innocent object of the search 
is a newspaper, First Amendment interests are also involved 
and that such a search is constitutionally permissible "only in 
the rare circumstances where there is a clear showing that 
(1) important materials will be destroyed or removed from 
the jurisdiction; and (2) a restraining order would be futile." 
!d., at 135. These preconditions to a valid warrant not having 
been satisfied here, the search of the Daily's offices was 
declared to have been illegal. The Court of Appeals affirmed 
per curiam, adopting the opinion of the District Court. 550 
F. 2d 464 (CA9 1977).8 We issued the writs of certiorari 
requested by petitioners. -U.S.- (1977).4 We reverse. 
3 The Court of Appeals also approved the award of attorney's fees to 
respondents pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 
1976, 42 U. S. C. § 1988. We do not consider the propriety of this a.ward 
in light. of our disposition on the merits reversing the judgment upon which 
the award was predicated. 
4 Petitioners in No. 76-1484 are the chief of police and the officers under 
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II 
The issue here is how the Fourth Amendment is to be 
construed and applied to the "third party" search, the recurring 
situation where state authorities have probable cause to believe 
th~tt fruits, instrumentalities, or other evidence of crime is 
located on identified property but do not then have probable 
cause to believe that the owner or possessor of the property is 
himself implicated in the crime that has occurred or is 
occurring. Because under the District Court's rule impracti-
cability can be shown only by furnishing facts demonstrating 
that the third party will not only disobey the subpoena but 
will also ignore a restraining order not to move or destroy the 
property, it is apparent tha.t only in unusual situations could 
the State satisfy such a severe burden and that for all practical 
purposes the effect of the rule is that fruits, instrumentalities, 
and evidence of crime ma.y be recovered from third parties only 
by subpoena, not by search warrant. At least, we assume that 
the District Court did not intend its rule to be toothless and 
anticipated that only subpoenas would be available in many 
cases where without the rule a search warrant would issue. 
It is an understatement to say that there is no direct 
authority in this or any other federal court for the District 
Court's sweeping revision of the Fourth Amendment. 5 Under 
his command who conducted the search. Petitioners in No. 76-1600 are 
the distrirt. attorney and a deputy district attorney who participated in the 
obtaining of the search warrant. The action against the judge who issued 
the warrant. was subsequently dismissed upon the motion of respondents. 
15 Respondents rely on four state cnses to support the holding that a 
warrant ma.y not issue unl•ess it is shown that a subpoena is impracticable: 
Owens v. Way, 141 Ga. 796, 82 S. E. 132 (1914); Newberry v. Carpenter, 
107 Mich. 567, 65 N. W. 530 (1895); People v. Carver. 172 Misc. 820, 16 
N . Y. S. 2d 268 (County Ct. 1939) . a11d Commodity Manufacturing Co., 
Inc . v. Moore, 198 N. Y. S. 45 (Sup. Ct. 1923). None of these cases, 
however, stands for the proposition arrived at by the District Court and 
urged by respondentil. The District. Court also drew upon Bacon v. United 
States, 449 F. 2d 933 (CA9 1971), but that case dealt with arrest of a 
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existing law, valid warrants may be issued to search any 
property, whether or not occupied by a third party, at which 
there is probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities 
or evidence of a crime will be found. Nothing on the face of 
the Amendment suggests that a third-party search warrant 
should not normally issue. The warrant clause speaks of 
search warrants issued on "probable cause" and "particularly 
describing the place to be searched" and the "persons or things 
to be seized." In situations where the State does not seek to 
seize "persons" but only those "things" which there is proba-
ble cause to believe are located on the J)lace to be searched, 
there is no apparent basis in the language of the Amendmen.t 
for also imposing the requirements for a valid arrest-proba-
ble cause to believe that the third party is implicated in the 
crime. 
As the Fourth Amendment has been construed and applied 
by this Court, "when the state's reason to believe incrimi-
nating evidence will be found becomes sufficiently great, the 
invasion of privacy becomes justified and a warrant to search 
and seize will issue." Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391, 
400 (1976). In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 
534-535 ( 1967), we indicated that in applying the "probable 
cause" standard "by which a particular decision to search is 
tested against the constitutional standard of reasonableness," 
it is necessary "to focus upon the governmental interest which 
allegedly justifies the official intrusion" and that in criminal 
investigations, a warrant to search for recoverable items · is 
reasonable "only when there is 'probable cause' to believe they 
will be uncovered in a particular dwelling." Search warrants 
are not directed a.t persons; they authorize the search of 
"places" and the seizure of "things," and as a constitutional 
matter they need not name the person from whom the things 
material witness and is unpersuasive with respect to the senrch for rriminal 
~vi(l~nce, 
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will be seized. United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143, 155 n. 
15 (1974). 
Because the State's interest in enforcing the criminal law 
and recovering evidence is the same whether the third party 
is culpable or not. the premise of the District Court's holding 
appears to be that State entitlement to a search warrant 
depends on the culpability of the owner or possessor of the 
place to be searched and on the State's right to arrest him. 
The cases are to the contrary. Prior to Camara v. Municipal 
Court, supra, and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), 
the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment was seen to be 
the protection of the individual against official searches for 
evidence to convict him of a crime. Entries upon property 
for civil purposes, where the occupant was suspected of no· 
criminal conduct whatsoever, involved only the more periph-
eral concern and the less intense "right to be secure from 
intrusion into personal privacy." Frank v. Marylnad, 359' 
U. S. 360, 365 (1950); Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 
530. These searches could proceed without warrant, as long 
as the State's interest was sufficiently substantial. Under this 
view. the Fourth Amendment was more protective where the 
place to be searched was occupied by one suspected of crime 
and the search was for evidence to use against him. Camara 
and See, disagreeing with Frank to this extent, held that a 
warrant is required where entry is sought for civil purposes, as 
well as when criminal law enforcement is involved. Neither 
case, however, suggested that to secure a search warrant the 
owner or occupant of the place to be inspected or searched must 
be suspected of criminal involvement. Indeed, both cases held 
that a less stringent standard of probable cause is acceptable 
where the entry is not to secure evidence of crime against the 
possessor. 
We have suggested nothing to the contrary since Camara 
and See. Indeed, Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 
397 U.S. 72. (1970), and United States v. Biswell, 406~U. S. 311!. 
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(1972), dispensed with the warrant requirement in cases 
involving limited types of inspections and searches. 
The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the 
owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the specific "things" to be 
searched for and seized are located on the property to which 
entry is sought.11 In Carroll v. U. S., 267 U. S. 132 (1925), 
6 The same view has bee11 expressed by those who have given close 
attention to the Fourth Amendment. "It. does not follow, however, that 
probable cause for arrest would justify the issuance of a search warrant, or, 
on the other hand, that probable cause for a search warrant would 
necessarily justify an arrest. Each require~ probabilitir~ as to somewhat 
different facts and circumstances-a point which is seldom made explicit in 
the appellate cases. . . . This mean:;, for one thing, that whilr probable 
cause for anest requires information ju::;tifying a rrason!lble belief that a 
crime has been committed ancl that a particular person committed it, a 
search warrant may be issued on a. complaint which does not identify any 
particular person as the likrly offender. Becnuse the complaint for a search 
warrant is not 'filed as the basis of a criminal prosecution,' it need not 
identify the per:;on in cha.rgc of the premises or name the pcrl:ion in 
possession or any other per:;on a:; the offender." LnFave, Search and 
Seizure: "The Course of True Law ... Has Not ... Run Smooth," La.w 
Forum. Summer 1966, 255, 260-261. "Furthermorr, a warrant may il:lSue 
to search the premises of anyone, without any showing tlmt the occupant 
is guilty of any offense whatever." Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional 
Int,erpretation 48-49 (1969). "Search warrants may be issurd only by a 
neutral and detached judicial officer, upon a showing of probablr cau::;c-
that is, reaRonable grounds to believC'-that. criminall~· related objrcts are 
in the place which the warrant authorizel:l to be searched, at thP timP< when 
the search io authorized to be conducted." Amstrrdam, Prr:;pertives on the 
Fourth Amendment , 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 358 (1974). 
"Two conclusions necess:uy to the i:;::;uance of the· warrant must b~ 
supported by l:lnb~;tantial evidence: that the item~> ><ought arr in fact 
seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activit~·, and that the 
items will br found in the placr to be ~earched. By compari:-;on, the right 
of arrest. arisr;; only when a crimr is commirtrd or attemptrd in thr 
presence of thr arrc::;ting officer or when thr officer hn~ 'f(.>a;;onable grounds 
to belirve'-sometimes stated 'probable cau~r to believr'-that a felony has 
been committed by the per~;on to be arrested. Although it would appear 
that the conclu:;ions which justify rither arre:;t or the i~:::uance of a search 
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where a car was stopped with probable cause to believe that it 
was carrying illegal liquor. it was claimed that the seizure of 
the liquor was unconstitutional because the occupant of car 
was not subject to arrest. The Court, however, said: 
"If their theory were sound, their conclusion would be. 
The validity of the seizure then would turn wholly on the 
validity of the arrest without a seizure. But the theory 
is unsound. The right to search and the validity of the 
seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest. They 
are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer 
has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend 
against the law." !d., at 158-159. 
The Court's ultimate conclusion was that "the officers here 
had justification for the search and seizure," that is, a reason-
able "belief that intoxicating liquor was being transported in 
the automobile which they stopped and searched." 267 U. 8.1 
at 162. Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694, 700-701 
(1931), is to the same effect. 
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 
reflects "the Fourth Amendment's policy against unreasonable 
sea,rch and seizures," United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 
105 n. 1 (1965), authorizes warrants to search for contraband, 
fruits or instrumentalities of crime or "any . . . property that 
constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense.'r 
Upon proper showing. the warrant is to issue "identifying the 
property and naming or describing the person or place to be 
searched." Probable cause for the warrant must be presented, 
but there is nothing in the Rule indicating that the officers 
warrant, must. be supported by Pvidence of the ;;ame degree of probity, it 
is clear that the conclusions themselvr:; arc not identical. 
"In the case of arrest, thP conclusion concern~ thr guilt of the arrPstee, 
whereas in the case of search warrants, the conclu:;iom; go to the com1Pction 
of the items sought with crime and to their present locrution." Comment, 
'28. U. Chi. L. Rev. 664,687 (1961). 
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must be entitled to arrest the owner of the "place" to be 
searched before a search warrant may issue and the "property" 
may be searched for and seized. The Rule deals with warrants 
to search, and is unrelated to a.rrests. Nor is there anything 
in the Fourth Amendment indicating that absent probable 
cause to arrest a third party. resort must be had to a subpoena.7 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit expressed the 
correct view of Rule 41 and of the Fourth Amendment when, 
disagreeing with the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the 
District Court in the present case, it ruled that " [ o] nee it is 
established that probable cause exists to believe a federal crime 
has been committed a warrant may issue for the search of any 
property which the magistrate has probable cause to believe 
may be the place of concealment of evidence of the crime." 
United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 536 F. 
2d 699, 703 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Wingate v. United 
States, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). Accord, State v. Tunnel Citgo 
Services, 149 N.J. Super. 427, 433, 374 A. 2d 32, 35 (1977). 
The net of the matter is that "searches and seizures, in a 
technical sense, are independent of, rather than ancillary to, 
arrest and arraignment." American Law Institute. A Model 
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, Commentary, 49,1 (1975). 
The Model Code provides that the warrant application "shall 
describe with particularity the individuals or places to be 
searched and the individuals or things to be seized, and shall 
be supported by one or more affidavits particularly setting 
forth the facts and circumstances tending to show that such 
individuals or things are or will be in the places or the things 
are or will be in possession of the individuals, to be searched." 
§ SS 220.1 (3). There is no suggestion that the occupant of 
7 Petitioners assert that third-party searches have long been authorized 
under California Penal Code § 1524, which provides that fruits, instru-
mentalities and evidence of crime "may be taken on warrant from any 
place, or from any person in whose possession [they] may be." The-
District Court did not advert to this provision. 
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the place to be searched must himself be implicated m 
misconduct. 
Against this background, it is untenable to conclude that 
property may not be searched unless its occupant is reasonably 
suspected of crime a.nd is subject to arrest. And if those 
considered free of criminal involvement may nevertheless be 
searched or inspected under civil statutes, it is difficult to 
understand why the Fourth Amendment would prevent entry 
onto their property to recover evidence of a crime not com-
mitted by them but by others. As we understand the structure 
and language of the Fourth Amendment and our cases ex-
pounding it, valid warrants to search property may be issued 
when it is satisfactorily demonstrated to the magistrate that 
fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crjme is located on 
the premises. The Fourth Amendment has itself struck the 
balance between privacy and public need, and there is no 
occasion or justification for a court to revise the Amendment 
and strike a new balance by denying the sea.rch warrant in the 
circumstances present here and by insisting that the investiga-
tion proceed by subpoena duces tecum, whether on the theory 
that the latter is a less intrusive alternative, or otherwise. 
This is not to questicm that "reasonableness" is the over-
riding test of compliance with the Fourth Amendment or to 
assert that searches, however or whenever executed, may never 
be unreasonable if supported by a warrant issued on probable 
cause and properly identifying the place to be searched and the 
property to be seized. We do hold, however, that the courts 
may not, in the name of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, 
forbid the States from issuing warrants to search for evidence 
simply because the owner or possessor of the place to be 
searched is not then reasonably suspected of criminal 
involvement. 
III 
In f:l,ny event, the reasons presented by the District Court 
and adopted by the Court of Appeals for arriving at its remark-
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able conclusion do not withstand analysis. First. as we have 
said, it is apparent that whether the third-party occupant is 
suspect or not. the State's interest in enforcing the criminal 
law and recovering the evidence remains the same; and it is 
the seeming innocence of the property owner that the District 
Court relied on to foreclose the warrant to ~earch. But as 
respondents themselves now concede, if the third party knows 
that contraband or other illegal materials are on his property, he 
is sufficiently culpable to justify the issuance of a search war-
rant. Similarly, if his ethical stance is the determining factor, 
it seems to us that whether or not he knows that the sought-
after articles are secreted on his property and whether or not 
he knows that the articles are in fact the fruits, instrumen-
talities, or evidence of crime, he will be so informed when the 
search warrant is served, and it is doubtful that he should then 
be permitted to object to the search, to withhold, if it is there, 
the evidence of crime reasonably believed to be possessed by 
him or secreted on his property, and to forbid the search and 
insist that the officers serve him with a subpoena duc.es tecum. 
Second , we are unpersuaded that the District Court's new 
rule denying search warrants against third parties and insisting 
on subpoenas would substantially further privacy interests 
without seriously undermining law enforcement efforts. 
Because of the fundamental public interest in implementing 
the criminal law, the search warrant, a heretofore effective and 
constitutionally acceptable enforcement tool, should not be 
suppressed on the basis of surmise and without solid evidence 
supporting the change. As the District Court understands it, 
denying third-party search warrants would not have substan-
tial adverse effects on criminal investigations because the 
nonsuspect third party, once served with a subpoena, will 
preserve the evidence and ultimately lawfully respond. The 
difficulty with this assumption is that search warrants are often 
employed early in an investigation, perhaps before the identity 
·of :any likely criminal and certainly before all the perpetrators 
76-1484 & 76-1600-0PINION 
ZURCHER v. STANFORD DAILY 13 
are or could be known. The seemingly blameless third party 
in possession of the fruits or evidence may not be innocent at 
all; and if he is, he may nevertheless be so related to or so 
sympathetic with the culpable that he cannot be relied upon 
to retain and preserve the articles that may implicate his 
friends, or at least not to notify those who would be damaged 
by the evidence that the authorities are aware of its location. 
In any event, it is likely that the real culprits will have access 
to the property, and the delay involved in employing the 
subpoena duces tecum, offering as it does the opportunity to 
litigate its validity, could easily result in the disappearance of 
the evidence, whatever the good faith of the third party. 
Forbidding the warrant and insisting on the subpoena 
instead when the object of the search is not then suspected of 
crime, involves hazards to criminal investigation much more 
serious tha.n the District Court believed; and the record is 
barren of anything but the District Court's assumptions to 
support its conclusions.8 At the very least, the burden of 
8 It is also far from clear, even apart from the dangers of destruction and 
removal, whether the use of the subpoena duces tecum under circumstaiices 
where there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed 
and that. the materials sought constitute evidence of its commission will 
result .in the production of evidence with sufficient regularity to sat.isfy the 
public interest in law enforcement. Unlike the individual whose priva.cy 
is invadPd by a search, the recipient of a subpoena may assert the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against. self-incrimination in response to a request to 
produce evidence or give testimony. See Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 449 
(1975). This privilege is not restricted to suspects. We ha.ve construed 
it broadly as covering any individual who might be incriminated by the 
evidence in connection with which the privilege is asserted. Hoffman v. 
United States, 341 U. S. 479 (1951). The burden of overcoming an 
assertion of the Fifth Amendment. privilege, even if prompted by a desire 
not to cooperate rather than any real fear of self-incrimination, is one which 
prosecutors would rarely be able to meet in the early stages of an investiga-
tion despite the fact they did not regard the witness as a suspect. Even 
time spent litigating such matters could seriously impede criminal 
investigations. 
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justifying a major revision of the Fourth Amendment has not 
been carried. 
We are also not convinced that the net gain to privacy 
interests by the District Court's new rule would be worth the 
candle.9 In the normal course of events, search warrants are 
more difficult to obtain than subpoenas, since the latter do not 
involve the judiciary and do not require proof of probable 
cause. Where, in the real world, subpoenas would suffice, it 
can be expected that they will be employed by the responsible 
prosecutor. On the other hand, when choice is available under 
9 Wo reject totally the reasoning of the District Court that additional 
protections are required to assure that the Fourth Amendment rights of 
third parties are not violated because of the unavailability of the exclu-
sionary rule as a deterrent to improper searches of premises in the control 
of nonsuspects. 353 F. Supp., at 131-132. In Alderman v. United States, 
394 U. S. 165 (1969), we expressly ruled that suppression of the fruits 
of a Fourth Amendment viola.tion may be urged only by those whose 
rights were infringed by tht> search itself and not by those aggrieved 
solely by the introduction of incriminating evidence. The predicate for 
this holding was that the aditional deterrent effect of permitting defendants 
whose Fourth Amendment rights had not been violated to challenge 
infringements of the priva.cy interests of others did not "justify further 
encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of 
crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the 
evidence which exposes the truth." !d .. at 175. For similar reasons, we 
conclude that the interest in deterring illegal third-party searches does not 
justify a rule such as that adopted by the District Court. It is probably 
seldom tha.t. police during the inveHtigatory stage when most searches occur 
will be so convincrd that no potential defendant will have standing to 
exclude evidrnce on Fourth Amendment grounds that they will feel free to 
ignore constitutional restraints. In any event, it would be placing the cart 
before tho horse to prohibit searches otherwise conforming to the Fourth 
Amendment becamw of a perception that the deterrence provided by the 
exi:sting rule,; of standing is insufficient to discourage illegal searches. Cf. 
·warden v. Ha.yden, 387 U.S. 244, 309 (1967). Finally, the District. Court 
overlooked the fact that tho California Supreme Court has ruled as a 
matter of l:ltate law that the legality of a search and seizure may be 
challenged b~· anyone against whom evidence thus obtained is used. 
Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 150,491 P. 2d 1 (1971). 
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local law and the prosecutor chooses to use the search warrant, 
it is unlikely that he has needlessly selected the more difficult 
course. His choice is more likely to be based on the solid 
belief, arrived at through experience but difficult, if not impos-
sible, to sustain in a specific case, that the warranted search is 
necessary to secure and to avoid the destruction of evidence.10' 
IV 
The District Court held, and respondents assert here, that 
whatever may be true of third-party searches generally, where 
the third party is a newspaper, there are additional factors 
derived from the first Amendment that justify a nearly per se 
rule forbidding the search warrant and permitting only the 
subpoena duces tecum. The general submission is that 
searches of newspaper offices for evidence of crime reasonably 
believed to be on the premises will seriously threaten the 
ability of the press to gather, analyze. and disseminate news. 
This is said to be true for several reasons: first, sea.rches will 
be physically disruptive to such an extent that timely publica-
tion will be impeded. Second, confidential sources of infor-
mation will dry up and the press will also lose opportunities 
to cover various events because of fears of the participants 
that press files will be readily available to the authorities. 
Third. reporters will be deterred from recording and preserving 
their recollections for future use if such information is subject 
to seizure. Fourth, the processing of news and its dissemina-
tion will be chilled by the prospects that searches will disclose 
'internal editorial delibera.tions. Fifth, the press will resort 
to self-censorship to conceal its possessiop of information of 
potential interest to the police. 
10 Petitioners assert that the District Court ignored the realities of 
California law and practice that are :;aid to preclude or make very difficult 
the usr of subpoenas as investigatory techniques. If true, the choice of 
procedures may not. alwnys be open to the diligent vrosecu.tor in tJm· 
State ·oi Califo:nnia~ 
76-1484 & 76-1600-DPINION 
16 ZURCHER v. STANFORD DAILY 
It is true that the struggle from which the Fourth Amend-
ment emerged "is largely a history of conflict between the 
Crown and the press." Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476. 482 
( 1965), and that in issuing warrants and determining the 
reason[lhleness of a search. state and federal magistrates should 
be aware that "unrestricted power of search and seizure could 
also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression." 
Marcus v. Search Warra.nt, 367 U. R. 717. 729 (1961). Where 
the materials sought to be seized may be protected by the 
First Amendment, the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment must be applied with "scrupulous exactitude." Stanford 
v. Texas, supra, at 485. "A seizure reasonable as to one type 
of material in one setting may be unreasonable in a different 
setting or with respect to another kind of material." Roaden 
v. Kentucky, 413 U. S. 496. 501 (1973). Hence. in Stamford v. 
Texas, the Court invalidated a warrant authorizing the search 
of a private home for all books, records, and other materials 
relating to the Communist Party, on the ground that whether 
or not the warrant would have been sufficient in other contexts, 
it authorized the searchers to rummage among and make 
judgments about books and papers and was the functional 
equivalent of a general warrant, one of the principal targets of 
the Fourth Amendmellt. Where presumptively protected 
materials are sought to be seized, the warrant requirement 
should be administered to leave as little as possible to the 
discretion or whim of the officer in the field. 
Similarly, where seizure is sought of allegedly obscene 
materials, the judgment of the arresting officer alone is insuf-
ficient to justify issuance of a search warrant or a seizure 
without a warrant incident to arrest. The procedure for 
determining probable cause must afford an opportunity for the 
judicial officer to "focus searchingly on the question of obscen-
ity." Marcus v. Search Warrant, supra, at 732; A Quarntity 
of Books v. Kansa.s, 378 U. S. 205. 210 (1964); Lee Art 
Theatre v. Virginia, 392 U. S. 636, 637 (1966); Roaden v. 
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Kentucky, supra, at 502; Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 
488- 489 ( 1973). ' 
Neither the Fourth Amendment nor the cases requiring 
consideration of First Amendment values in issuing search 
warrants, however, call for imposing the regime ordered by the 
District Court.. Aware of the long struggle between Crown 
and press and desiring to curb unjustified official intrusions, the 
Framers took the enormously important step of subjecting 
searches to the test of reasonableness and to the general rule 
requiring search warrants issued by neutral magistrates. They 
nevertheless did not forbid warrants where the press was 
involved. did not require special showings that subpoenas 
would be impractical, and did not insist that the owner of the 
place to be searched, if connected with the press. must be 
shown to be implicated in the offense being investigated. 
Further, the prior cases do no more than insist that the courts 
apply the warrant requirements with pa.rticular exactitude 
when First Amendment interests would be endangered by the 
search. As we see it, no more than this is required where the 
warrant requested is for the seizure of crimina.} evidence 
reasonably believed to be on the premises occupied by a 
newspaper. Properly administered, the preconditions for a 
warrant-probable cause, specificity with respect to the place 
to be searched and the things to be seized, and overall reason-
ableness-should afford sufficient protections against the harms 
that are assertedly threatened by warrants for searching 
newspaper offices. 
There is no reason to believe, for example, that magistrates 
cannot guard a.gainst searches of the type. scope, and intru-
siveness that would actually interfere with the timely publi-
cation of a newspaper. Nor, if the requirements of specificity 
and reasonableness are properly applied, policed, and observed, 
will there be any occasion or opportunity for officers to 
rummage at large in newspaper files or to intrude into or to 
deter normal editorial and publication decisions. Nor a.re we 
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convinced, a.nymore than we were in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 
U. S. 665 (1972). that confidential sources will disappear and 
that the press will suppress news because of fears of warranted 
searches. Whatever incremental effect there may be in this 
regard if search warrants, as well as subpoenas, are permissible 
in proper circumstances, it does not make a constitutional 
difference in our judgment. 
The fact is tha.t respondents and a.mici have pointed to only 
a very few instances in the entire United States since 1971 
involving the issuance of warrants for searching newspaper 
premises. This reality hardly suggests abuse; and if abuse 
occurs. there will be time enough to deal with it. Further-
more, the press is not only an important, critical, and valuable 
asset to society, but it is not easily intimidated-nor should it 
be. J1!1i'as a remarka,ble ability to take care of its interests 
and to protect itself against abuse at the hands of public 
officials, including the police and prosecuto~ 
Respondents also insist that the press s uld be afforded 
opportunity to litigate the State's entitlement to the material 
it seeks before it is turned over or seized and that whereas the 
search warrant procedure is defective in this respect, resort to 
the subpoena would solve the problem. The Court has held 
that a restraining order imposing a prior restraint upon free 
expression is invalid for want of notice and opportunity for a 
hearing, Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U. S. 175 (1968), and 
that seizures not merely for use as evidence but entirely 
removing arguably protected materials from circulation may 
be effected only after an adversary hearing and a judicial 
finding of obscenity. A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 
U. S. 205 (1964). But presumptively protected materials are 
not necessarily immune from seizure under warrant for use at 
a criminal trial. Not every such seizure, and not even most, 
will impose a prior restraint. Heller v. New York, supra. 
And surely a wa.rrant to search newspaper premises for crim-
"inal evidence such as the one issued here for news photographs. 
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taken in a public place carries no realistic threat of prior 
restraint or of any direct restraint whatsoever on the publica-
tion of the Daily or on its communication of ideas. The 
hazards of such warrants can be avoided by a neutral magis-
trate carrying out his responsibilities under the Fourth 
Amendment, for he has ample tools at his disposal to confine 
warrants to search within reasonable limits. 
We note finally that if the evidence sought by warrant 
is sufficiently connected with the crime to satisfy the probable 
cause requirement, it will very likely be sufficiently relevant to 
justify a subpoena and to withstand a motion to quash. Fur-
ther, Fifth Amendment and state shield law objections that 
might be asserted in opposition to compliance with a sub-
poena are largely irrelevant to determining the lf bptu f a 
search warrant under the Fourth Amendment. course, 
state legislative or executive authorities may by statute. rule, ----/' 
or practice extend wha.tever protections they deem wise to 
safeguard the press, as well as others, from possibly over-
reaching sea.rches, either by insisting on subpoenas as a gen· 
eral rule, by forbidding searches for particular kinds of mate-
rials, by providing opportunity to object in advance of the 
search, or otherwi,_j The Fourth Amendment plainly does· 
not prevent or advise against such protections. But neither 
should the Amendment now be interpreted to impose a. gen-
eral constitutional barrier against warrants to search news-
paper premises, to require resort to subpoenas as a general 
rule, or to demand prior notice and hearing in connection with 
the issuance of search warrants. 
VI 
We accordingly reject the reasons given by the District 
·Court and adopted by the Court of Appea.Is for holding the 
search for photographs at the Stanford Daily to have been 
unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
~nd iu. viol!;ttion of the First Amendment. Nor has anything 
.. 
. • 
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else presented here persuaded us that the Amendments for-
bade this search, It follows that the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals is reversed. 
So ordered . 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 76-1484 AND 76-1600 
James Zurcher, Etc., et al., Petitioners, 
76-1484 v. 
The Stanford Daily et al. 
Louis P. Bergna, District Attorney, 
and Craig Brown, Petitioners, 
76-1600 v. 
The Stanford Daily et al. 
[March -, 1978:] 
On Writs of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit. 
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The terms of the Fourth Amendment, applicable to the 
States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, are familiar: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particuarly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 
As heretofore understood, the Amendment has not been a 
barrier to warrants to search property on which there is 
probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or 
evidence of crime is located, whether or not the owner or 
possessor of the premises to be searched is himself reasonably 
suspected of complicity in the crime being investigated. We 
are now asked to reconstrue the Fourth Amendment and to 
hold for the first time that when the place to be searched is 
occupied by a person not then a suspect, a warrant to search 
for criminal objects and evidence reasonably believed to be 
J 
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located there should not issue except in the most unusual 
circumstances, and that except in such circumstances, a sub-
poena duces tecum must be relied upon to recover the objects 
or evidence sought. 
I 
Late in the day on Friday, April 9, 1971, officers of the Palo 
Alto Police Department and of the Santa Clara County 
Sheriff's Department responded to a call from the director of 
the Stanford University Hospital requesting the removal of a 
large group of demonstrators who had seized the hospital's 
administrative offices and occupied them since the previous 
afternoon . After several futile efforts to persuade the demon-
strators to leave peacefully, more drastic measures were 
employed. The demonstrators had barricaded the doors at 
both ends of a hall adjacent to the administrative offices. The 
police chose to force their way in at the west end of the 
corridor. As they did so, a group of demonstrators emerged 
through the doors at the east end and, armed with sticks and 
clubs, attacked the group of nine police officers stationed there. 
One officer was knocked to the floor and struck repeatedly on 
the head; another suffered a broken shoulder. All nine were 
injured.'l There were no police photographers at the east 
doors. and most bystanders and reporters were on the west side. 
The officers themselves were able to identify only two of their 
assailants, but one of them did see at least one person photo-
graphing the assault at the east doors. 
On Sunday, Aprilll , a special edition of the Stanford Daily 
(Daily) , a student newspaper published at Stanford Univer-
sity, carried articles and photographs devoted to the hospital 
protest and the violent clash between demonstrators and 
police. The photographs carried the byline of a Daily staff 
member and indicated that he had been at the east end of the 
hospital hallway where he could have photographed the assault 
'1 There was extensive damage to the administrative offices resulting from 
the occupation and the removal of the demonstrators:. 
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on the nine officers. The next day, the Santa Clara County 
District Attorney's Office secured a warrant from the munic-
ipal court for an immediate search of the Daily's offices for 
negatives, film and pictures showing the events and occurrences 
at the hospital on the evening of April 9. The warrant issued 
on a finding of "just, probable and reasonable cause for 
believing that: Negatives. photographs, and films, evidence 
material and relevant to the identification of the perpetrators 
.of felonies, to wit, Battery on a Peace Officer, and Assault with 
a Deadly Weapon, will be located ·[on the premises of the 
Daily]." App. 31-32. The warrant affidavit contained no 
allegation or indication that merpbers of the Daily staff were 
in any way involved in unlawful acts at the hospital. 
The search pursuant to the warrant was conducted later that 
day by four police officers and took place in the presence of 
some members of the Daily staff. The Daily's photographic 
laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, a.nd waste paper baskets were 
searched. Locked drawers and rooms were not opened. The 
officers apparently had opportunity to read notes and cor-
respondence during the search; but contrary to claims of the 
staff, the officers denied that they had exceeded the limits of 
the warrant.2 They had not been advised by the staff that the 
areas they were searching contained confidential materials. 
The search revealed only the photographs that had already 
been published on April 11 , and no materials were removed 
from the Daily's office. 
A month later the Daily and various members of its staff, 
respondents here, brought a civil action in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 
against the police officers who conducted the search, the chief 
of police, the district attorney and one of his deputies, and the 
judge who had issued the warrant. The complaint alleged 
that the search of the Daily's office had deprived respondents 
2 The District Court did not find it neoessary to resolve this dispute .. 
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under color of state law of rights secured to them by the First, 
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United Sta.tes 
Constitution. 
The District Court denied the request for an injunction 
but on respondents' motion for summary judgment, granted 
declaratory relief. 'stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 
124 (ND Cal. 1972). The court did not question the existence 
of probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed 
and to believe that relevant evidence would be found on the 
Daily's premises. It held, however, that the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments forbade the issuance of a warrant to 
search for materials in possession of one not suspected of crime 
unless there is probable cause to believe, based on facts pre-
sented in a sworn affidavit, that a subpoena duces tecum 
would be impracticable. Further, the failure to honor a 
subpoena would not alone justify a warrant; it must also 
appear that the possessor of the objects sought would disregard 
a court order not to remove or destroy them. The District 
Court further held that where the innocent object of the search 
is a newspaper, First Amendment interests are also involved 
and that such a sea.rch is constitutionally permissible "only in 
the rare circumstances where there is a clear showing that 
(I) important materials will be destroyed or removed from 
the jurisdiction; and (2) a restraining order would be futile."' 
!d., at 135. These preconditions to a valid wa.rra.nt not having 
been satisfied here, the search of the Daily's offices was 
declared to have been illegal. The Court of Appeals affirmed 
per curiam, adopting the opinion of the District Court. 550 
F. 2d 464 (CA9 1977).8 We issued the writs of certiorari 
requested by petitioners. - U.S. - (1977).4 We reverse. 
3 The Court of Appeals also approved the award of attorney's fees to 
respondents pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 
1976, 42 U. S. C. § 1988. We do not consider the propriety of this award 
in light of our disposition on the merits reversing the judgment upon which 
the award was predicated. 
4 :Petitione~:s in No. 76-1484 arc the chief of police and the officers under· 
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II 
The issue here is how the Fourth Amendment is to be 
construed and applied to the "third party" search, the recurring 
situation where state authorities have probable cause to believe 
that fruits, instrumentalities, or other evidence of crime is 
located on identified property but do not then have probable 
cause to believe that the owner or possessor of the property is 
himself implicated in the crime that has occurred or is 
occurring. Because under the District Court's rule impra.cti-
cability can be shown only by furnishing facts demonstrating 
that the third party will not only disobey the subpoena but 
will also ignore a restraining order not to move or destroy the 
property, it is apparent that only in unusual situations could 
the State satisfy such a severe burden and tha.t for all practical 
purposes the effect of the rule is that fruits, instrumentalities, 
and evidence of crime may be recovered from third parties only 
by subpoena, not by search warrant. At least, we assume that 
the District Court did not intend its rule to be toothless and 
anticipated that only subpoenas would be available in many 
cases where without the rule a search warrant would issue. 
It is an understatement to say that there is no direct 
authority in this or any other federal court for the District 
Court's sweeping revision of the Fourth Amendment.(; Under 
his command who conducted the search. Petitioners in No. 76-1600 are 
the distrirt attorney and a deputy district attorney who participated in the 
obtaining of tho search warrant. The action against the ,iudge who issued 
the warrant was subsequently dismissed upon the motion of respondents. 
15 Respondents rely on four state cases to support the holding that a 
warrant may not issue unless it is shown that a subpoena is impracticable: 
Owens v. Way, 141 Ga. 796, 82 S. E. 132 (1914); Newberry v. Carpenter, 
107 Mich. 567, 65 N. W. 530 (1895); People v. Carver, 172 Mi:>c. 820, 16 
N.Y. S. 2d 268 (County Ct. 1939) , and Commodity Manufacturing Co., 
Inc. v. Moore, 19R N. Y. S. 45 (Sup. Ct. 1923) . None of these cases, 
however, stands for the proposition arrived at by the District Court and 
urged by respondents. The District. Court. also d·rew upon Bacon v. United· 
St:ates, 449 F, 2d 933 (CA9 1971), but that ca::;e dealt wi.th arrest of 11: 
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existing law, valid warrants may be issued to search any 
property, whether or not occupied by a third party, at which 
there is probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities 
or evidence of a crime will be found. Nothing on the face of 
the Amendment suggests t~at a third-party search warrant 
should not normally issue, The warrant clause speaks of 
search warrants issued on "probable cause" and "particularly 
describing the place to be searched" and the "persons or things 
to be seized." In situations where the State does not seek to 
seize "persons" but only those "things" which there is proba-
ble cause to believe are located on the place to be searched, 
there is no apparent basis in the language of the Amendment 
for also imposing the requirements for a valid arrest-proba-
ble cause to believe th'at the third party is implicated iq the 
crime. 
As the Fourth Amendment has been construed and applied 
by this Court, "when the state's reason to believe incrimi-
nating evidence will be found becomes sufficiently great, the 
invasion of privacy becomes justified and a warrant to search 
and seize will issue." Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391, 
400 (1976). In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 
534-535 ( 1967), we indicated that in applying the "probable 
cause" standard "by which a particular decision to search is 
tested against the constitutional standard of reasonableness," 
it is necessary "to focus upo.11 the governmental interest which 
allegedly justifies the official intrusion" and that in criminal 
investigations, a warrant to search for recoverable items is 
reasonable "only when there is 'probable cause' to believe they 
will be uncovered in a particula.r dwelling." Search warrants 
are not directed at persons; they ~;~.uthorize the search of 
"places11 and the seizure of "things," and as a constitutional 
matter they need not name the person from whom the things 
material witness and is unpersuasivc with respect to the search for criminal. 
evid.t)nce. 
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will be seized. United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143, 155 n. 
15 (1974). 
Because the State's interest in enforcing the criminal law 
and recovering evidence is the same whether the third party 
is culpable or not. the premise of the District Court's holding 
appears to be that State entitlement to a search warrant 
depends on the culpability of the owner or possessor of the 
place to be searched and on the State's right to arrest him. 
The cases are to the contrary. Prior to Camara v. Municipal 
Court, supra, and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), 
the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment was seen to be· 
the protection of the individual against official searches for 
evidence to convict him of a crime. Entries upon property 
for civil purposes, where the occupant was suspected of no 
criminal conduct whatsoever, involved only the more periph-
eral concern and the less intense "right to be secure from 
intrusion into personal privacy." Frank v. Marylnad, 359 
U. S. 360, 365 (1950); Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 
530. These searches could proceed without warrant, as long· 
as the State's interest was sufficiently substantial. Under this 
view, the Fourth Amendment was more protective where the 
place to be sea.rched was occupied by one suspected of crime 
and the search was for evidence to use against him. Camara 
and See, disagreeing with Frank to this extent, held that a 
warrant is required where entry is sought for civil purposes, as 
well as when criminal law enforcement is involved. Neither 
case, however, suggested that to secure a search warrant the 
owner or occupant of the place to be inspected or searched must 
be suspected of criminal involvement. Indeed, both cases held. 
that a less stringent standard of probable cause is acceptable 
where the entry is not to secure evidence of crime against the 
possessor. 
We have suggested nothing to the contrary since Camara· 
and See. Indeed, Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 
3.9'Z U. S. 72. ( 1970) , and United States v. Biswell, 4.00.U. S. 3J.n 
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(1972), dispensed with the warrant requirement in cases 
involving limited types of inspections and searches. 
The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the 
owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the specific "things'' to . be 
searched for and seized are located on the property to which 
entry is sought.6 In Carroll v. U. S., 267 U. S. 132 (1925), 
6 The same view has been expressed by those who hav£> given close 
attention to the Fourth Amendment. "It does not follow, however, that 
probable cause for arrest would justify the issuance of a search warrant, or, 
on the other hand, that probable cause for a. search warrant would 
necessarily justify an arrest. Each requires probabilities as to somewhat 
different facts and circumstances-n point which is seldom tru~d£> explicit in 
the appellate cast's. . . . This mf'an;;, for on£> thing, that while probable 
cause for arrest requires information justif~·ing a reasonable belief that a 
crime has be£>n committed and that a particular person committed it, a 
search warrant may be issuE>d on a complaint which dOE's not identify any 
particular person a;; the likely offender. Because the complaint for a search 
warrant is not 'filed as the basis of a criminal prosecution,' it need not 
identify the person in charg£> of the premises or name the person in 
pQSsession or any other person as the offender." LaFavf', Search and 
Seizure: "The Course of True Law ... Has Not ... Run Smooth," La.w 
Forum, Summer 1966, 255, 260-261. "Furthermor£>, a warrant may issue 
to search the premises of anyon£>, without any showing that the occupant 
is guilty of any offens£> what£>ver." Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional 
Interpretation 48-49 (1969). "Search warrants may be issuro only by a. 
neutral and detached judicial officer, upon a showing of probable cause-
that is, reasomtble grounds to belirve--that crimina.Jiy related objects are 
in the place which the wa.rrant authorizes to be searched, at the time< when 
the search is authorized to be conducted." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the 
Fourth Amendment, 5R Minn. L. Rev. 349,358 (1974). 
"Two conclusions necessary to the issuance of the warrant must be 
supported by substantial evidence: that the items sought are in fact 
seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the 
items will be found in the place to be searched. By comparison, the right 
of arrest arises only when a crime is committed or attempted in the 
presence of the arresting officer or when the officer has 'rpm;onable grounds 
to believe'-sometimes stated 'probable cause to believe'-that a felony has· 
been committed by the person to be arrested. Although it would appear 
~b.(lt the conch1.sions which justify either an:e~t or the issuance of a search: 
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where a car was stopped with probable cause to believe that it 
was carrying illegal liquor, it was claimed that the seizure of 
the liquor was unconstitutional because the occupant of car 
was not subject to arrest. The Court, however, said: 
"If their theory were sound, their conclusion would be. 
The validity of the seizure then would turn wholly on the 
validity of the arrest without a seizure. But the theory 
is unsound. The right to search and the validity of the 
seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest. They 
are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer 
has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend 
against the law." !d., at 158-159. 
The Court's ultimate conclusion was that "the officers here 
had justification for the search and seizure," that is, a reason-
able "belief that intoxicating liquor was being transported in 
the automobile which they stopped and searched." 267 U. S.r 
at 162. Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694, 700-701 
(1931), is to the same effect. 
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 
reflects "the Fourth Amendment's policy against unreasonable 
search and seizures," United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 
105 n. 1 ( 1965), authorizes warrants to search for contraband, 
fruits or instrumentalities of crime or "any ... property that 
constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense." 
Upon proper showing, the warrant is to issue "identifying the 
property and naming or describing the person or place to be· 
searched." Probable cause for the warrant must be presented, 
but there is nothing in the Rule indicating that the officers 
warrant. must be supported b): evidence of the samr degree of probity, it 
is clear that the conclusions them:;elves ar£> not identical. 
"In the caS(' of arrest, th£> conclusion concern!' thr guilt. of the arre:;tee; . 
whereas in the cas£> of search warrants, the conclusions go to the connection 
of the items sought with crime and to their pre:;ent location."' Comment, 
2S_.lf. ChL.L .. Rev. 6.64, 687. (1961}1• 
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must be entitled to arrest the owner of the "place" to be 
searched before a search warrant may issue and the "property" 
may be searched for and seized. The Rule deals with wa.rrants 
to search, and is unrelated to a.rrests. Nor is there anything 
in the Fourth Amendment indicating that absent probable 
cause to arrest a third party. resort must be had to a subpoena.7 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit expressed the 
correct view of Rule 41 and of the Fourth Amendment when, 
disagreeing with the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the 
District Court in the present case. it ruled that "[o]nce it is 
established that probable cause exists to believe a federal crime 
has been committed a warrant may issue for the search of any 
property which the magistrate has probable cause to believe 
may be the place of concealment of evidence of the crime;" 
United Sta.tes v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 536 F. 
2d 699, 703 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Wingate v. United 
States, 429 U. S. 1039 (1977). Accord, State v. Tunnel Citgo 
Services, 149 N.J. Super. 427, 433, 374 A. 2d 32, 35 (197-7). 
The net of the matter is that "searches and seizures, · in a 
technical sense, are independent of, rather than ancillary to, 
arrest and arraignment." American Law Institute. A Model 
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, Commentary, 491 (1975). 
The Model Code provides that the warrant application tcshall 
describe with particularity the individuals or places to be 
searched and the individuals or things to be seized, and shall 
be supported by one or more affidavits particularly setting 
forth the facts and circumstances tending to show that such 
individuals or things are or will be in the places or the things 
are or will be in possession of the individuals, to be searched.n 
§ SS 220.1 (3). There is no suggestion that the occupant of 
7 Petitioners assert tha.t third-party searches have long been authorized 
under California . .Penal Code § 1524, which provides that fruits, instru-
mentalities and evidence of crime "may be taken on wa.rrant from any 
place, or from any person in whose possession [they] ma.y be." The· 
Di.stri.ct Court did not advert t{) this provision, 
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the place to be searched must himself be implicated m 
misconduct. 
Against this background, it is untenable to conclude that 
property may not be searched unless its occupant is reasonably 
suspected of crime and is subject to arrest. And if those 
considered free of criminal involvement may nevertheless be 
searched or inspected under civil statutes, it is difficult to 
understand why the Fourth Amendment would prevent entry 
onto their property to recover evidence of a crime not com-
mitted by them but by others. As we understand the structure 
and language of the Fourth Amendment and our cases ex-
pounding it, valid warrants to search property may be issued 
when it is satisfactorily demonstrated to the magistrate that 
fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located on 
the premises. The Fourth Amendment has itself struck the 
balance between privacy and public need, and there is no 
occasion or justification for a court to revise the Amendment 
and strike a new balance by denying the search warrant in the 
circumstances present here and by insisting that the investiga-
tion proceed by subpoena duces tecum, whether on the theory 
that the latter is a less intrusive alternative, or otherwise. 
This is not to question that "reasonableness" is the over-
riding test of compliance with the Fourth Amendment or to 
assert that searches, however or whenever executed, may never 
be unreasonable if supported by a warrant issued on probable 
cause and properly identifying the place to be searched and the 
property to be seized. We do hold, however, that the courts· 
may not, in the name of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, 
forbid the States from issuing warrants to search for evidence 
simply because the owner or possessor of the place to be 
searched is not then reasonably suspected of criminal 
involvement. 
III 
In a.ny event, the reasons presented by the District Court 
and adopted by the Court of Appeala for arriving at its remark-
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able conclusion do not withstand analysis. First, as we have 
said, it is apparent that whether the third-party occupant is 
suspect or not, the State's interest in enforcing the criminal 
law and recovering the evidence remains the same; and it is 
the seeming innocence of the property owner that the District 
Court relied on to foreclose the warrant to search. But as 
respondents themselves now concede, if the third party knows 
that contraband or other illegal materials are on his property, he 
is sufficiently culpable to justify the issuance .of a search war-
rant. Similarly, if his ethical stance is the determining factor, 
it seems to us that whether or not he knows that the sought-
after articles are secreted on his property and whether or not 
he knows that the articles are in fact the fruits , instrumen-
talities, or evidence of crime, he will be so informed when the 
search warrant is served, and it is doubtful that he should then 
be permitted to object to the search, to withhold, if it is there, 
the evidence of crime reasonably believed to be possessed by 
him or secreted on his property, and to forbid the search and 
insist that the officers serve him with a subpoena duces tecum. 
Second , we are unpersua.ded that the District Court's new 
rule denying search warrants against third parties and insisting 
on subpoenas would substantially further privacy interests 
without seriously undermining law enforcement efforts. 
Because of the fundamental public interest in implementing 
the criminal law, the search warrant, a heretofore effective and 
constitutionally acceptable enforcement tool, should not be 
suppressed on the basis of surmise and without solid evidence 
supporting the change. As the District Court understands it, 
denying third-party search warrants would not have substan-
tial adverse effects on criminal investigations because the 
nonsuspect third party, once served with a subpoena, will 
preserve the evidence and ultimately lawfully respond. The· 
difficulty with this assumption is that search warrants are often 
employed early in an investiga.tion, perhaps before the identity 
of any likely criminal and certainly before all the perpetrators· 
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are or could be known. The seemingly blameless third party 
in possession of the fruits or evidence may not be innocent at 
all; and if he is, he may nevertheless be so related to or so 
sympathetic with the culpable that he cannot be relied upon 
to retain and preserve the articles that may implicate his 
friends, or at least not to· notify those who would be damaged 
by the evidence that the authorities are aware of its location. 
In any event, it is likely that the real culprits will have access 
to the property, and the delay involved in employing the 
subpoena duces tecum, offering as it does the opportunity to 
litigate its validity, could easily result in the disappearance of 
the evidence, whatever the good faith of the third party. 
Forbidding the warrant and insisting on the subpoena 
instead when the object of the search is not then suspected of 
crime, involves hazards to criminal investigation much more 
serious than the District Court believed; and the record is 
barren of anything but the District Court's assumptions to 
support its conclusions.8 At the very least, the burden of 
8 It is also far from clear, even apart from the dangers of de:.iruction and 
removal, whether the use of the subpoena duces tecum under circumstances 
where there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed 
and that the materials sought constitute evidence of its commission will 
result in the production of evidence with sufficient regularity to satisfy the 
public intt>rest in law enforcement. Unlike the individual whose privacy 
is invaded by a search, the recipient of a subpoena may a::;sert the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against. self-incrimination in response to a request. to 
produce evidence or give testimony. See Maness v. Myers, 419 U. S. 449 
(1975). This privilege is not restricted to suspects. We have construed 
it broadly as covering any individual who might be incriminated by the 
evidence in connection with which the privilege is asserted. Hoffman v. 
United States, 341 U. S. 479 (1951). The burden of overcoming an 
.assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege, even if prompted by a desire 
not to cooperate rather than any real fear of self-incrimination, is one which 
prosecutors would rarely be able to meet in the early stages of an investiga-
tion despite the fact they did not regard the witness as a suspect. Even 
time spent litigating such matters could seriously impede crimina! 
investigations. 
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justifying a major revision of the Fourth Amendment has not 
been carried. 
We are also not convinced that the net gain to privacy 
interests by the District Court's new rule would be worth the 
candle.9 In the normal course of events, search warrants are 
more difficult to obtain than subpoenas, since the latter do not 
involve the judiciary a.nd do not require proof of probable 
cause. Where, in the real world, subpoenas would suffice, it 
can be expected that they will be employed by the responsible 
prosecutor. On the other hand, when choice is available under 
9 We reject totally the reasoning of the District Court that additional 
protections are required to assure that the Fourth Amendment rights of 
third parties are not violated because of the unavailability of the exclu-
sionary rule as a deterrent to improper searches of premises in the control 
of nonsuspects. 353 F. Supp., at 131-132. In Alderman v. United States, 
394 U. S. 165 (1969), we expressly ruled that suppression of the fruits 
of a Fourth Amendment violation may be urged only by those whose 
rights were infringed by the search itself and not by those aggrieved 
solely by the introduction of incriminating evidence. The predicate for 
this holding was tha.t the aditional deterrent effect of permitting defendants 
whose Fourth Amendment rights had not been violated to challenge 
infringements of the privacy interests of others did not "justify further 
encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of 
crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the 
evidence which exposes the truth." /d., at 175. For similar reasons, we 
conclude that the interest in deterring illegal third-party searches does not 
justify a rule such as tha.t adopted by the District Court. It is probably 
seldom tha.t. police during the investigatory stage when most searches occur 
will be so convinced that no potential defendant will have standing to 
exclude evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds that they will feel free to 
ignore constitutional restraints. In any event, it would be placing the cart 
before the horse to prohibit searches otherwise conforming to the Fourth 
Amendment brcau~e of a perception that the deterrence provided by the 
existing ntles of standing is insufficient to discourage illegal searches. Cf. 
Warden v. Ha:yden, 387 U.S. 244, 309 (1967). Finally, the District Court 
overlooked the fnct that the California Supreme Court has ruled ns a 
matter of st<lte lnw t.hnt the legality of a search and seizure may be 
cha.lleuged by anyone against whom evidence thus obtafned is used_ 
Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 150,491 P. 2d 1 (197.1). 
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local law and the prosecutor chooses to use the search warrant, 
it is unlikely that he has needlessly selected the more difficult 
course. His choice is more likely to be based on the solid 
belief, arrived at through experience but difficult, if not impos-
sible, to sustain in a specific case, that the warranted search is 
necessary to secure and to avoid the destruction of evidence.10 
IV 
The District Court held, and respondents assert here, that 
whatever may be true of third-party searches generally, where 
the third party is a newspaper. there are additional factors 
derived from the first Amendment that justify a nearly per se 
rule forbidding the search warrant and permitting only the· 
subpoena duces tecum. The general submission is that 
searches of newspaper offices for evidence of crime reasonably 
believed to be on the premises will seriously threaten the 
ability of the press to gather, analyze, and disseminate news. 
This is said to be true for several reasons: first, searches will 
be physically disruptive to such an extent that timely publica-
tion will be impeded. Second, confidential sources of infor-
mation will dry up and the press will also lose opportunities 
to cover various events because of fears of the participants 
that press files will be readily available to the authorities. 
Third, reporters will be deterred from recording and preserving 
their recollections for future use if such information is subject 
to seizure. Fourth , the processing of news and its dissemina-
tion will be chilled by the prospects that searches will disclose 
internal editorial delibera.tions. Fifth, the press will resort 
to self-censorship to conceal its possession of information of 
potential interest to the police. 
10 Petitioners assert that the District Court ignored the realities of 
Californja law and pract.ice that a.re said 1o preclude or make very difficult 
the use of subpoenas as investigatory techniques. If true, the choice of 
proccdurrs may not alwa.ys be open to the diligent proseclil.tor in too 
State o£ Califo.uuac. 
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It is true that the struggle from which the Fourth Amend-
ment emerged "is largely a history of conflict between the 
Crown and the press," Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476. 482 
(1965), and that in issuing warrants and determining the 
reasonableness of a search. state and federal magistra.tes should 
be aware that "unrestricted power of search and seizure could 
also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression." 
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717.729 (1961). Where 
the materials sought to be seized may be protected by the 
First Amendment. the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment must be applied with "scrupulous exactitude." Stanford 
v. Texas , supra, at 485. "A seizure reasonable as to one type 
of materia.! in one setting may be unreasonable in a different 
setting or with respect to another kind of material." Roaden 
v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496. 501 (1973). Hence. in Stam,ford v. 
Texas, the Court invalidated a warrant authorizing the search 
of a private home for all books. records, and other materials 
relating to the Communist Party, on the ground that whether 
or not the warrant would have been sufficient in other contexts, 
it authorized the searchers to rumma.ge ~ong and make 
judgments about books and pa.pers and was the functional 
equivalent of a general warrant. one of the principal targets of 
the Fourth Amendment. Where presumptively protected 
materials are sought to be seized, the warrant requirement 
should be administered to leave as little as possible to the 
discretion or whim of the officer in the field. 
Similarly, where seizure is sought of allegedly obscene 
materials, the judgment of the arresting officer alone is insuf-
. ficient to justify issuance of a search warrant or a seizure 
without a warrant incident to arrest. The procedure for 
determining probable cause must afford an opportunity for the 
judicial officer to "focus searchingly on the question of obscen-
ity." Marcus v. Search Warrant , supra, at 732; A Quarntity 
of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205, 210 (1964); Lee Art 
Theatre v. Virginia, 392 U. S. 636, 637 (1966); Roaden ·V. 
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Kentucky, supra, at 502; Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 
488-489 ( 1973). 
Neither the Fourth Amendment nor the cases requiring 
consideration of First Amendment values in issuing search 
warrants, however, call for imposing the regime ordered by the 
District Court. A ware of the long struggle between Crown 
and press and desiring to curb unjustified official intrusions, the 
Framers took the enormously important step of subjecting 
searches to the test of reasonableness and to the general rule 
requiring search warrants issued by neutral magistrates. 'They 
nevertheless did not forbid warrants where the press was 
involved, did not require special showings that subpoenas 
would be impractical, and did not insist that the owner of the 
place to be searched, if connected with the press, must be 
shown to be implicated in the offense being investigated. 
Further, the prior cases do no more than insist that the courts 
apply the warrant requirements with particular exactitude 
when First Amendment interests would be endangered by the 
search. As we see it, no more than this is required where the 
warrant requested is for the seizure of criminal evidence 
reasonably believed to be on the premises occupied by a 
newspaper. Properly administered, the preconditions for a 
warrant-probable cause, specificity with respect to the place 
to be searched and the things to be seized, and overall reason-
ableness-should afford sufficient protections against the harms 
that are assertedly threatened by warrants for searching 
newspaper offices. 
There is no reason to believe, for example, that magistrates 
cannot guard against searches of the type, scope, and intru-
siveness that would actually interfere with the timely publi-
cation of a newspaper. Nor, if the requirements of specificity 
and reasonableness a.re properly applied, policed, and observed, 
will there be any occasion or opportunity for officers to 
rummage at large in newspaper files or to intrude into or to 
deter- normal editorial and publication decisions. Nor are we 
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convinced, anymore than we were in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 
U.S. 665 (1972) , that confidential sources will disappear and 
that the press will suppress news because of fears of warranted 
searches. Whatever incremental effect there may be in this 
regard if search warrants, as well as subpoenas, are permissible 
in proper circumstances. it does not make a constitutional 
difference in our judgment. 
The fact is that respondents and a.mici have pointed to only 
a very few instances in the entire United States since 1971 
involving the issuance of warrants for searching newspaper 
premises. This reality hardly suggests abuse; and if abuse 
occurs. there will be time enough to deal with it. Further-
more, the press is not only an important, critical. and valuable 
asset to society, but it is not easily intimidated-nor should it 
1 
to\ 
be. · O fl'lt$£6·, 
Respondents also insist that the press should be afforded 
opportunity to litigate the State's entitlement to the material 
it seeks before it is turned over or seized and that whereas the 
search warrant procedure is defective in this respect, resort to 
the subpoena would solve the problem. The Court has held 
that a restraining order imposing a prior restraint upon free 
expression is invalid for want of notice and opportunity for a 
hearing, Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U. S. 175 (1968). and 
that seizures not mere1y for use as evidence but entirely 
removing arguably protected materials from circulation may 
be effected only after an adversary hearing and a judicial 
finding of obscenity. A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 
U. S. 205 (1964) . But presumptively protected materials are 
not necessarily immune from seizure under warrant for use at 
a criminal trial. Not every such seizure, and not even most, 
will impose a prior restraint. Heller v. New York, supra. 
And surely a wa.rrant to search newspaper premises for crim-
inal evidence such as the one issued here for news photographs· 
taken in a public place carries no realistic threat of prior 
restraint or of any direct restraint whatsoever on the publica-
tion Qf the Daily or o:n it,s communication of ideas. The 
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hazards of such warrants can be avoided by a neutral magis-
trate carrying out his responsibilities under the Fourth 
Amendment, for he has ample tools at his disposal to confine 
warrants to search within reasonable limits. 
We note finally that if the evidence sought by warrant 
is sufficiently connected with the crime to satisfy the probable 
cause requirement. it will very likely be sufficiently relevant to 
.iustify a subpoena and to withstand a motion to quash. Fur-
ther, Fifth Amendment and state shield law objections that 
might be asserted in opposition to complia.nce with a sub-
poena are largely irrelevant to determining the legality of a 
search warrant under the Fourth Amendment. Of course, 
the Fourth Amendment does not prevent or advise against 
legislative or executive efforts to establish nonconstitutional 
protections a.gainst possible abuses of the search warrant pro-
cedure, but we decline to reinterpret the Amendment to impose 
a general constitutiona.I barrier against warrants to search 
newspaper premises, to reqvire resort to subpoenas a~ a 
general rule, or to demand prior notice and hearing in connec-
tion with the issuance of search warrants. 
VI 
We accordingly reject the reasons given by the District 
Court and adopted by the Court of Appeals for holding the 
search for photographs at the Stanford Dai·ly to have been 
unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
and in violation of the First Amendment. Nor has anything 
else presented here persuaded us that the Amendments for-
bade this search. It follows that the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals is reversed. 
So ordered. 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN took no part in the consideration or \ 
decision of this case. 
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Newsp~pers Debating . 
:Effect of Court Ruling8 . 
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.. On Their ·operati?~ · 
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By DEIRDRE CARMODY · ·. ; .: 
Two years ago, when a New Jersey, 
judge ordered M.A. Farber, a reporter 
for The New York Times, sent to jail for 
refusing to turn over his notes in a mur- . 
der trial, many journalists warned that i 
· news sources around the country would . 
cease talking to ·reporters for fear that ! 
the reporters would no longer be able to i 
protect the identities of their confidential l 
sources. . ~ .·· 
)'dany reporters and editors expressed 
similar fears about the effects of rulings 
by the United States Supreme Court con-
cerning newsroom searches, access to 
judicial proceedings and• definitions of 
libel. They predicted that these rulings 
would seriously curb the ability of the t 
press to uncover corruption or to main- i 
taln effective scrutiny of Government. l 
· Today, as more than S50 editors of daily 
newspapers convene In Washington for .1 
the annual meeting of the American Soci- ~ 
ety of Newspaper Editors, the effects of . 
these court rulings are still not clear. 
In some areas, there has been virtually 
no effect. Not a single newsroom has been 
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· Dally that the police couli::l ol~tain war· .. ,Critl~ of the media say that the press tlon of a public figure we are very 
rants .to search. news o.rgani2:citions for ~~too hkely to cry wolf ~d that none of clearly a lot mo~ ca~tious,'• .. :Said • ~.- . 
. . . inal ~d if ., , . . the effects of the court decisions has been 1 Halvorsen, managing editor of !The Sari , 
c,nm ~.r• ence even . no ttll~e at ,the as severe as newspaper executives said I Fran · Ex · . •.. ~·"';l·~""'''•· u~ ... 
newspaper _was~~. ~f-~! ~ing co~- . they would be . . Editors and publishers J. Th~~~~inc~:;~:~·rii?i~i·~~~~ fi~~~~~f~ 
r;nittedacnme. ": . ~·"·:,, 1 :,!·r'<-l :-· 1 >·~···· ~. reply tha~ if the p~ had remained si:- A "public figure"ttas to provtd1ot on1 · ~~ 
::.On the other hand, since .Jui.V.~ 2, 1979, le~~ •. ~e s~tuation m1ght well be worse._. ., I that what was· said was inacCUrate bur 
when the Court. ruled in Ga mett, .v. · :.}4.:~!'.''-.:j{f, A Never-Eridlng Battle ·< ...... ·: t:,:!,; ialso that the newspaper .published . it ~: ··. 
~P~le that Judges could c lose pre- ... - '.'The hittle to keep communi~tions I ~owing that it was false o~ ~th ~~ ~- , < .-:· 
trial heanngs to the press ~d to·the pu~! arteries' open is never-ending," 'said Wil·l·disregard. as to ~hether 1t was truE;, or_·· 
llc,therehavebeen239motionstdbarthe 1 liam H. Hornby, editor of The Denver·false. Private f1~ do ~ot ,,,bav;e,.~ · ~ ... 
public and the press fr:om· crtmij1a1 jus- ! Post and president of the American Soci: ! ~rove the nev.:spaper s m~ent. i"..t;; fl{~}i.N~J}· 1 
Uce proceedings. At least 'Sl of th•~~;e were · ety of Newspaper Editors. "We have to 1 .The Exanuner s ·~ul!on .~ .~emon-: ··1 ~ · 
attempts to close actual trials or:& mten~ j ~elude that if the press didn't have thE! 1 strated in an extens1ve mvesug~ti?D the : 
ing proceedings . . ":·~t?'(\"''1'_.: .~!~:·\'\ ~_·;·~~~:~ 11mage. of being ready to leap into the bat-Jnewspaper con~ucted of1 the c1ty_s .fire· . 1 
,'The effect . of . the . court' 'ded~s on . tie on. mstant notice, the pressure to close . B?.d pohce pensiOn tun<:ts·. The pa~r ha~.~; 
· news sources seems to be. slight. s .ome of these lines of communications would be I discovered that many fu~ and pollee ~ff1~ .t 
. the worry stemmed from the easel of Mr. worse. Here in Colorado we have turned .1 c~t:S had left the force Wlth.tax-fr:ee di~--;; Farber, who went to jail ·forAiJ days , around three o/ four decisions that would 1 bthty pay and ~en gone on, to get. othe~ ~· 1 ,, . 
rather than turn over his '·notes .f i.i1 the i have ~u~o~atically closed trials if,we had more strenuous JObs. (One became a .ka- ·:, 
murder trial of Dr. Mario E. Jascalevich;, rema~e<isllent.'-' ·. ~: . :· t;: ~. 1.'·.'~ . . ·,:·: ::·:·.··: .. ; -rate instructor.) Reportersdoc:umenteda,. 
v.;ho was acquitted. ·;;: \ J;,;.; (~; .:•,1\l };~·~ , j · B~ VIrtually every editor's account, the ~~be~ of <:a~ ~d then(Mr: l!~vorsen . 
~ But of two dozen ' editors '· wh·~ · were·lclosi?&.ofcourtroomstothepressandthe • me. ~ Ig ques .~on .. ,.:'::":'''}~~e · 
l 
asked if they knew of any instanre,iwhere pubhc 1s. the question of. mo&t ·immediate ~~~e hu~hc fir? !"' ~· · ~1.~ :.t~N'1:!t1;r:~"t~.1; 
sources had failed to ci>ine forw~lrd or i concern. .Wh~ the · Supreme Court ~ a t? t e the posture ~at pollee.·., j 
. I been reluctant to talk ·as a result l of the! han~~ down Its_ Gannett v: DePasquale land fire officers are not pubhc .figures;;'· 
I current judicial climate the m a. ority I deciSion, there was a great deal of confu.- I ~d the ~awyers had to go through the en.:- ' I 
I Said they did not know ~~ such .. k in- si~?D as to whether it applied only to pre- j tire senes," Mr. H~lvorst;n · said,.~ ~·we( stance. .. ~~. '. ~: : .. ,,,~ ;,-: . . - ' , IJ. .;..,.; 1 trial procedings or whether judges could ,still had enough topnnt but ,lttoo~a.great . 
"W h · f · d · • .• ·\ .· close trials and sente cl eedin Ideal of work anct cost us a lot ·m ·legal .. e ave not oun a smgle sltllatlon I 
11 
'th n .ng proc . gs fees" • .'ci· .!',,·:; ... ;. _~~o.;:.•; .. :w.·, ,-.·,'1!-;,~~-:,;J ;. ~:.,·., 
hke that," said Robert Greene, an assist- j as we WI . out any additional heanng. . ' · ·: · ., • . ·• ·:: .. ·' , , >.; :;\{:~'1. -:.;· 
ant managing editor of Newsda 'Y and • The confus1on became worse when no ! Many e?Itors .feel that lawyers often. 
chairman of Investigative Reporters and 1 fewer than five ~f . the justices com- i threaten ~1bel swts k?owin~ tJ;l:eir ellen~ 
.Editors, a l,~member national c !fgani- I mented later on the1r own interpretations I cannot. Wln damages If <l tnal1s h~ld, but . 
~.tion: · ... _,.. :. ;, .. ·.;:,; ,. ~;;;, .... <, ....... .... ,·~, ;,'.·.· ,
1 
of the case, ea~-~~ "fffering somewhat ~ga~blmg th~t ... ~~.n~~P~~~ .. "11A.~~~.:, • 
.. , .... , .. 'AD n1n Eff • .. 1 .. , .•· .: f~m theoth~r . ..... 1 "' • • _ .. , . . ou .. f court ... _ ·" V ,.. . ( . .. , ..... ~,,..~~. n. ;·.~>» .. . · .. . ampe g ect • ··. ( ·· > · The hope 1S that the Court will clarify · In the last two or three years I would' 
. ·.' ~·In general, these court decision! have' I its views on ·the closing of courtrooms . say that the biggest pressure on the aver- . 
had a very ~efinite d~~pening eff• ~toni la~er this term. It has before it a case, Jag~ editor has, been~ increase in libel 
ou~ a~~stve purswt m some al!'eaS," :Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, in 1 s~ts brought . for nmsance purposes,''.·:~ i 
1.sa1d Wilham F; Thomas, editor of The l whichacircuitcourtjudge upheld by the !sa1d Mr: ~ornby , of The Denver Post:.; 
I 
Los Angeles Times. "You spend ..a lot Virginia Supreme Court 'excluded the i "These cost money .and are expensive to ' 
more time with lawyers than you U! sed to . press from a murder trial.without a hear-,ifight whether you're right or y.rro_ng.·~·-':~~.:10-
1 and .you ~end to thro. w away no~e f and j mg after the defense attorney. said that ~othe.r Supreme. Court decision tn-': 
I 
CO?fldential pape~. that .otherw1s1 ~ you .. px:ess coverage would jeopardize his volvu~g hbel that. brought forth a strong .. 
, mtgh~ have ~ept." . · •.;.·': · .·· 'i'r .. .
1 
ch.ent's right to a fair trial. . . ... ·reactiOn f,rom the press at the time .was , 
I 
: In mtemews Wlth editors, repclrters . The Reporters Committee for Freedom past years Herbert. v. Lando decision. ·"· 
and lawyers who specialize in ;First 1 of the Press, v.ith the. cooperation of press ! The Fourt ~eld that a public figure suing : · 
1 Amendm~mt .· ~es, . , .these ·' points 1 groups around the country, has been lfo~ h~l could ask questions during pre-,·. 
eme~ed. . . . . ·. ~. - . · · ..... ,_ ~· ·.-~·\ \ . · , 1 ~eept_ng count of the attempts to close ltrtal discovery a'?<>ut the th?ughts, opin- .· «<L~bel swts are prohferatmg. Iu the 
1 
JUdiCial proceedings since the Gannett ions and ~nclus10ns of .editors and re:, ·. 
past It was difficult for public figures to : ruling. As of Friday, the committee said, lpor:ers ,While tll~~had been preparing an .. 
l
.sue newsp~pers successfully, but rrecent 
1
· itknewof239. : "' .. , · ~: , · .. , .. 1·a~cle. ~ost editors w~o were inter- : .court dec1st~ns have !lar:rowed the d efini-
1 
. The _group has conducted a detailed. VIewed sa1d that so far th1s_ decision bad .. 
tion of who 1s a pubhc f1gure. The result I analysis of the motions to close criminal I no~ had an ef~ect on them.· · . ·. ;-.>_:,f!' .• 1 •:1 .\'-~ .·. 
\ h~ been a dramatic increase in ' 'libel proced.ings from July 2 until Feb. 15: · ."The cruc1~l test ~II be how: far the . 
swts, although th~ total number i:J not .! Their figures show 185 attempts at clo- jud~t;> a~ gomg to go m Jill owing discov-• . 
known. · ' . ·. · ,. : ····"·' , · :1 ,. . sure during that period. Of these, 83 were lery, sa1d ~r. Boccard1 t;>f 1Jte Associ- . 
«<~gal cost;s have soared. A few years j refused or withdrawn, and about 100 were Ia ted Press, If they permit _discovery to · 
ago, most editors. rarely consulted Jaw- : granted, Of the 185 attempts, 121 involved fa!lge outs1d.e the story. at _ 1ssue~ then J, · 
yers o~ news stones. Only one or tv. io of ; pretrial proceedings, 'S7 involved trials or !thmk ~a~ Will be a r;;aJOr mtrus10n into 
I 
the maJOr newspapers had in-house OI:!'Wl- I convictions, 19 involved pre-indictment !the edltonal process.. • ····•:: :,'·· · ' J ·~. _. .. _,~-,. 
sel. Today, almost all major newspa})ers I proceedings and eight involved sentenc-1 Although most ed1tors SB.ld that they _ 
I 
do, and ~ven smaller papers find . i:'hat . ings. . . ~ · . .,. , , !had not felt that news sources had dried 
. they a~ m weekly, even daily consulta- . Louis D. Boccardi, executive editor of up as a res~t of. the Farber case and 
i t~on w1th the.lr a_ttorneys about the l1egal The Associated Press, says that his news 1other cases m whic'h reporters notes had . 
1 ns~ ~f.pubtl(;atton, especially about ;the service has seen an increase in cases !been .subpoenaed, Jack ~d~rson, the 
l 
~tb1hty of libel. ,,,~ '!" , , ., r 4 •• ") . . .where the press and the public are al- Washmgton-based columrust, disagreed . 
. : CINew newsroom practices.. wllri'.ch ~owed to remain in the courtroom but the ! . "Solid Sources· who know we will go to 
I woul~ave been unheard of a few yt\lus JUdge orders the press not to write about 1 jail before identifying them are still com-
, ago, '. elude formal proc~ures for .ode- the proceedings. Most editors who knew : ing to liS," Mr, :Anderson said. "I don't 
sw}'lng tthotes or transfe:nn~ them to an of suc:h cases said that such orders had II know of any way of measuring the effect 
o tcerfo e
11
nev.:s orgaruzat10n; the iHsu- eventually been overturned. . • ·- ' ·. ~· on the new sources we are trym' g to de . 
ance o wa et s1zed cards t · ' · -'with state · 0 n:port ~rs · The effect of court decisions narrov.;ng 1 velop. But we're seeing an uneasiness. · · 
!.stat in th~;~ ~be ~ad. al~ud ·~co ~rt the "efiniti.on of a public figure in libel :"J?ey are asking us what the court .deci-
1 in the gevent - d rg~zat~on s ObJect 10n cases are difficult to assess. Some editors : s1ons mean, which they never asked be- · 
' the courtroo~ JU ~~· t rs , e P~~ fnlm say that the d'Jef result has simply b...--en :fore. They joke about it but the jokes are 
. • an 1 QfS CQmnJhnP. ( ,o... f(l m~\to tho ru••,r•C"C: ,...,n..., 1'"'"~"'U" ~""' ~' .... 1n ~·1-. ~ - n P rVn11C ;n\t-~1:" " - . 
., 
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Dear Byron: 
:. 
Re: 76-1484;1600 Zurcher; Bergna v. Stanford Daily 
I join. I will add: 
"I see no need to distinguish between newspaper 
offices, offices of doctors, lawyers and many 
others whose premises contain sensitive, 
confidential material. I would, of course, 
not give the "press" a lesser protection) I 
would protect all equally. See my concurring 
opinion in 76-1172 First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti dated " 
Re~ 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
To: The Chiefl Just i('P 
Mr. Justice Bronra~ 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marsh~ll 
Mr. Just ice Bl·1 ,-:.._,n 'n 
./ Mr. Justice Pu,ve.ll 
Mr . Justice R hnq 4 i~t 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: Mr. Justice St~w1rt 
2 7 APR 1978 
Circulated: _ 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT:m 
Nos. 76-1484 AND 76-1600 
James Zurcher, Etc., et a.l., Petitioners, 
76-1484 v. 
The Stanford Daily et al. On Writs of Certiorari 
to the United States 
/ 
Louis P. Bergna, District Attorney, 
and Craig Brown, Petitioners, 
Court of Appeals for , 
11 
~ . 
the Ninth Circuit. )v'-
76-1600 v. 
The Stanford Daily et al. 
:[Ma.y -, 1978] 
Mn. JusTICE STEWART, dissenting. 
Believing that the search by the police of the offices of The 
Stanford Daily infringed the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments' guarantee of a free press, I respectfully dissent.1 
I 
Tt seems to me self-evident that police searches of news-
paper offices burden the freedom of the press. The most 
immediate and obvious First Amendment injury caused by 
such a yjsitation by the police is physical disruption of the 
operation of the newspaper. Policemen occupying a news-
room and searching it thoroughly for what may be an extended 
period of time 2 will inevitably interrupt its normal operations, 
and thus impair or €"ven temporarily prevent the processes of 
newsgathering, writing, editing, and publishing. By contrast, 
1 I agrro with t]l(l Court that th<' Fou1'th Amrndmmt does not forbid the 
iR~nancr of sra rch wa.rrantR "~imp!~· bcr<tUSt' the own<'r or posst>SSor of the 
plaer to br ~car('hrd i:-; not then rrm;onlLbly snsper1ed of criminal involve-
mr.nt." Ante, at 11. 
2 Onr ~-;earch of n radio station i11 L>-~ Angrl!"'i la~ted over eight hours. 
Not<-, Search and Seizure of thr ~Iedia: A Statutory, Fourth Amendment 
and First Amcndmout Analy~is, 28 Stan. L . Rev . 957,957-959 (1976). 
0~ 
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76-14 4 & 76-1600-DISSENT 
2 ZURCHER t'. STANFORD DAILY 
a subpoena would afford the newspaper itself an opportunity 
to locate whatever material might be requested and produce it. 
But there is another aud more serious burden on a free press 
imposed by an unannounced police sea.rch of a newspaper 
office: the possibility of disclosure of information received from 
confidential sources. or of the identity of the sources them-
selves. Protection of those sources is necessary to ensure that 
the press can fulfill its constitutionally designated function of 
informing the public,3 because important information can often 
be obtained only by an assurance that the source will not be 
revealed. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 725-736 (dis-
senting opinion) .4 And the Court has recognized that "with-
out some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the 
press could be eviscerated." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 
833. 
Toda.y the Court does not question the existence of this 
constitutional protection, but says only that it is not "con-
vinced . . . that confidential sources will disappear a.nc.l that 
the press will suppress news because of fears of warranted 
searches." Ante, at 17-18. This facile conclusion seems to 
me to ignore common experience. It requires no blind leap 
of faith to understand that a person who gives information to 
a journalist only on condition that his identity will not 'be 
revealed will be less likely to give that information if he 
knows that, despite the journalist's assurance, his identity 
may in fact be disclosed. And it cannot be denied that con-
fidential informa.tion may be exposed to the eyes of police offi-
cers who execute a search warrant by rummaging through the 
a See Mills v. Alabama, 3R4 U. S. 214, 219; New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 269; Grosjean V. American Press ro., 297 U. S. 
2:~3. 250. 
·• Recognizing tlw importune(' of thi~ confidential relation~hip, 26 States 
havf' Pnacted so-callrd "shiP!d law~" prot rcti ng reporler~. Notr, Thl' Ncw~­
man ':; Privilege Aftrr Branzburg: Thr C~e for a Federal ShiPld Law, 24 
U. C' . I... A. L. Rev. 160, 167 n, 4l (1976). 
' •· 
70-1484 & 76-1600-DISSENT 
ZURCHER v. STANFORD DAILY 3 
files , cabinets, desks and wastebaskets of a newsroom.r. Since 
the indisputable effect of such searches will thus be to prevent 
a newsman from being able to promise confidentiality to his 
potential sources, it seems obvious to me that a journalist's 
access to information, and thus the public's, will thereby be 
impaired.6 
A search warrant allows police officers to ransack the files of 
a newspaper, reading each and every document until they have 
found the one named in the warrJLnt,' while a subpoena would 
permit the newspaper itself to produce only the specific docu-
ments requested. A search, unlike a subpoena, will therefore 
lead to the needless exposure of confidential information com-
pletely unrelated to the purpose of the investigation. The 
knowledge that police officers can make an unannounced raid 
on a newsroom is thus bound to have a deterrent effect on 
the availability of confidential news sources. The end result, 
wholly inimical to the First Amendment, will be a diminish-
ing flow of potentially important information to the public. 
r. In this case, the policemen executing the search warrant were con-
cededly in a position to read confidential material unrelated to the object 
of their search; whether they in fact did so is disputed. 
0 This prospect of losing access to confidential sources may cause report-
ers to enagage in "self-censorship," in order to avoid publicizing the fa.ct 
that they may have confidential information. See New f o1·k Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 275; Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 154. 
Or, journalists may destroy notes and photographs rather than save them 
for reference and use in futuro ~torie~. Either of these indirect effects of 
police searches would further le;;sen the flow of nPws to the public. 
7 The Court. &tys that " if the requirements of specificity [Uld rPasonable-
nes;; arc properly applied, policed and observed" there will be no oppor-
tunity for the police to "rummage at large in newspaper files. " Ante, at 
17. But. in order to find a particular document , no matter how specifically 
it is identified in the warra.nt, the police will have to search every place 
where it. might be-including, presmmlbly, every filP in the office-and 
to examine each document. they find to see if it is the correct ont'. I thus 
fail to seo how the Fourt.h Amcndmcnt. would provide an effective limit to 
thesr Ren rches. 
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One need not rely on mere intuition to reach this conclusion. 
The record in this case includes affidavits not only from mem-
bers of the staff of The Sta~ford Daily but from many profes .. 
sional journalists anq editors, attesting to precisely such 
personal e,xperience.8 Despite the Court's rejection of this 
uncontroverted ~yidenoe, I believe it clearly establishes that 
unannounced police searches of newspaper offices will signifi. 
cantly burden the constitlltionally protected function of the 
press to gather news and report it to the public. 
II 
In Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, the more limited disclosure 
of a journalist's sources caused by compelling him to testify 
was held to be justified by the necessity of "pursuing and 
prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by informants 
and in thu~ deterring the commission of such crimes in the 
future." 408 U. S., at 69·5. The Court found that these 
important societal interests would be frustrated if a reporter 
were able to claim an absolute privilege for his confidential 
sources. In the present c~e, however, the respondents do 
not claim that any of the evidence sought was privileged from 
disclosure; they claim only that a subpoena would have served 
equally well to produce that evidence. Thus, we are not con-
cerned with the principle, central to Branzburg, that "'the 
public has a right to every ma.n's evidence,' " id., at 688, but 
only with wpether any significant societal interest would be 
· impaired if the police were generally required to obtain evi-
s According to these uncontradicted affidavits, when it becomes known 
that. a newsman cannot guarant<>e confidentiality, potential solll'ces of infor-
mat.ion often become unavailable. Moreover, efforts ar<> sometimes made, 
occasionally by force, to prevent reporters and photographers from cover-
ing urwsworthy events, because of fear that the policf\ will tieize the news-
man's not.es or photogmphs as evidence. The a.ffidavits of thl' members 
of thP sta.ff of The Stanford Daily give examples of how this very search 
produced such an impact on the Da.ily's own journalistic functions. 
.;,. 
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dence from the press by means of a subpoena rather than a 
search. 
It is well to recall the actual circumstances of this case. 
The application for a warrant showed only that there was 
reason to believe that photographic evidence of assaults on the 
police would be found in the offices of The Stanford Daily. 
There was no emergency need to protect life or property by an 
immediate search. The evidence sought was not contraband, 
but material obtained by the Daily in the normal exercise of 
its journalistic function. Neither the Daily nor any member 
of its staff was suspected of criminal activity. And there was 
no showing the Daily would not respond to a subpoena com-
manding production of the photpgraphs, or that for any other 
reason a ~ubpoena could not be obtained. Surely, then, a 
subpoena d1.tces tecum would have been just as effective as a 
police raid in obtaining the production of the material sought 
by the Santa Clara Couny District Attorney. 
The District · Court and the Court of Appeals clearly recog-
nized that if tpe affidavits submitted with a search warrant 
applicatim1 should demonstrate probable cause to believe that 
a subpoenfi' would be impractical, the magistrate must have 
the authority to issue a warrant. In such a case. by definition, 
a subpoena would not be adequate to protect the relevant 
societal inf,erest. But they held. and I agree, that a warrant 
should is~tte only after the magistrate has perfor111ed the care-
ful "balanc [in g) of tpese vital constitutional and societal 
interests." Branzbur(J v. Hayes, supra, at 710 (concurring 
opinion of MR. JusTICE PowELL).9 
n The petitioners have argue-d here that in fact there was reason to be-
lieve t.hat the Daily would not honor a subpoena. Regardless of the pro-
bative value of this information, it is irrelevant, since it. was not before the 
magistrate when he issued tj1c warrant. Whiteley Y. Wa1'den, 401 U. S. 
560, 565 n . 8; Spinelli v. Unitec{ States, 393 U. S. 410, 413 n. 3; Aquila?' v. 
Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 109 n . 1; sec Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 
10, 13.-14. 
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The decisions of this Court establish that a prior a.c!versar:y 
judicial hearing is ge11erally required to assess in advance any 
fhreatened invasion of First Amendment rights. 10 A search 
by police affords 110 timely opportunity for such a hearing, 
~ince a search warrant is ordinariJy issue~ ex parte upon th~ 
affidavit of a policeman or prosecutor. There is no oppor-
tunity to challenge thf- necessi~y for th~ s~arch until after 
~t has occpred ~n9 the cqn!'ltitutional protection of the news-
paper has been irretrievabJy invad~d. 
On the other h!tnt::L a s1,1bpoen~ would 11llow a newspaper) 
through a motion to quash, an opportunity for an !tdversjlry 
hearing with respect to the productiqn of any material which 
a prosecutor might thipk i~ in i~ possession. This very prin .. 
piple WitS emphasized in th!.'l Br(lnf,burg case: 
'
1[I]f the newsman is ca-lled upon to give information, 
b{'laring only a remote and tenuous relationship to the 
subject of the investigation, or if he hli& some other reason 
to believe that his testimony implicates confidential 
source relationships without a legitimate need of l~tw 
enforcement, he will have access to the Court on a motion 
to quash and an appropriate protective order may be 
entered." 408 U. S., at 710 (concurring opinion of MR. 
JUSTICE POWELL); sec also id., at 707-708. 
If, in the present case, The Stanford Daily had been served 
with a subpoena, it would have had an opportunity to demon~ 
strate to the court what the police ultimately found to be 
true-that the evidence sought did not exist. The legitimate 
needs pf government thus would h::we been served without 
infringing the freedom of the press. 
to E. g., United States " · Thirty-Seven Photoomphs, 402 U. S. 363 ; 
Carroll v. Princess Anne, 39;{ U.S. 175; Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 
51 ; cf. Roaden y . Kenturky, 413 U. S. 496 ; A Quantity of Copies of 
Books v. Kansas,"378 U.S. 205 ; Marcus v. Searrh Warrant, 367 U.S. 717. 
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IIII 
Perhaps as a matter of abstract policy a newspaper office 
should receive no more- protection from unannounced police 
searches than, say. the office of a doctor. But we are here to 
uphold a Constitution. And our Constitution does not ex-
licitly protect the practice of medicine from all abridgment by 
government. It does explicitly protect the freedom of the 
press. 
For these reasons I would affirm the judgmeut of the Court 
of Appeals. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTI C E THURG OOD MARSHA LL 
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cc: The Conference 
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ZURCHER v. STANFORD DAILY, No. 76-1484 & No. 76-1600 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and I ... write simply 
to emphasize what I take to be the fundamental error of 
the dissenting opinion. As I understand the dissent, it 
reads the First Amendment 
itt ~ififaati; aR a~~teRiiilll&Rti wpen ehat AmenelmentC.. 
Thus, we are the dissent to read the Fourth 
Fourth Amendment contains 
e~~ehee. See post, at 7. 
If the Framers had believed that the press was entitled 
~o a special set · of procedures when government authorities 
required evidence in its possession, ~--~~3~ ..... we certainly 
could expect that they would have indicated as much in the 
terms of the Fourth Amendment. As the opinion of the Court 
points out, the struggle from which the Fourth Amendment 
emerged was that between Crown and Press. Ante, at 15. 
The Framers were painfully aware of that history, and their 
solution was the Fourth Amendment. Ante, at 17. r! n Hence, 
there is every reason to believe that the usual procedures 
contemplated by the Fourth Amendment do indeed apply to the 
2. 
press as to every other citizen. 
This is not to say that a warrant that would be 
reasonable in supporting the search of an apartment or auto-
mobile _ necessarily would be reasonable in supporting the 
search of a ... newspaper office. But as the Court points 
out, if the requirements of reasonableness and specificity 
are stringently applied, the dangers perceived by the dissenting 
Ibirlr 
opinion are likely to be avoided:-]The magistrate must judge 
the reasonableness of __. every warrant in light of the 
circumstances of each case, .. carefully considering the 
situation of the premises and the position of the owner or 
occupant. For example, if a single document is sought, 
~res;oses J 
and the only fact presented is that itBhaY"il!lf somewhere 
inside the" office building of a huge met·ropolitan newspaper, 
the specificity requirement ~'z~eil•? .. .- might not be met, since 
the disruption that would ensue upon a room-by-room search 
could be well nigh total. 
Considerations ~ such as this, however, are the province 
of the 
~ e,·~ 
Fourth Amendment){'\here is no authorityAin history or 
in the Constitution itself for exempting classes of persons 
from its reach. 
' . 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
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I join the opinion of the Court, and I write simply to 
emphasize what I take to be the fundamental error of the 
dissenting opinion. As I understand the dissent, it reads the 
First Amendment as implicitly carving an exception out of 
the Fourth. Thus, we are admonished by the dissent to read 
into the Fourth Amendment, as a new and per se exception , 
the rule that any search of an entity protected by the Press 
Clause of the First Amendment is unreasonable. See post, 
at 7. I see no constitutional basis for such a reading. 
If the Framers had believed that the press was entitled to 
a special procedure, not available to others, when govern-
ment authorities required evidence in its possession, one 
would have expected the terms of the Fourth Amendment to 
reflect that belief. As the opinion of the Court points out, 
the struggle from which the Fourth Amendment emerged was 
that between Crown and press. Ante, at 15. The Framers 
were painfully aware of that history, and their response to it 
was the Fourth Amendment. Ante, at 17. Hence, there is 
every reason to believe that the usual procedures contem-
plated by the Fourth Amendment do indeed apply to the 
press, as to every other person. 
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This is not to say that a warrant which would be sufficient 
to support the sea.rch of an apartment or an automobile neces-
earily would be reasonable in supporting the search of a 
newspaper offlce'l As the Court's opinion makes clear ,~he 
magistrate must judge the reasonablei1ess of every warrant 
in light of the circumstances of the particular case, carefully 
considering the description of the evidence sought, the situa-
tion of the premises, and the position and interests of the 
owner or occupant. If the reasonableness and specificity re-
quirements are duly applied, the dangers perceived by the 
dissenting opinion are likely to be minimal. ~loee~ia!~.~--
In any event, considerations such as these are the province 
of the Fourth Amendment. There is no authority either. in 
history or in the Constitution itself for . exempting certain 
sses of personx :rom its reach. 
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1[May -, 1978] 
Mn. JusTICE STEWART, dissenting. 
Believing that the search by the police of the offices of The 
Stanford Daily infringed the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments' guarantee of a free press, I respectfully dissent.1 
I 
It seems to me self-evident that police searches of news-
paper offices burden the freedom of the press. The most 
immediate and obvious First Amendment injury caused by 
such a visitation by the police is physicaJ disruption of the 
operation of the newspaper. Policemen occupying a news-
room and searchi11g it thoroughly for what may be an extended 
period of time 2 will inevitably interrupt its normal operations, 
allcl thus impair or even temporarily prevent the processes of 
ncwsgathering, writing, editing, and publishing. By contrast, 
1 I ngrPc with thfl C'ourt that t.lw Fow·th Amendment does not forbid the 
i~Hnnncr of srareh warrant.<; "simp!~· bccaufl<' the own<>r or posst>ssor of the 
plar.(' to b<' ~careht>d i~ not then reasonably susper1ed of criminal involve-
mr.nt ." Ante, at 11. 
2 Onr :,;eareh of n radio >;tation in LoH Ange!Cfl lasted over eight hours. 
Note, Sca,rrh and Seizure of tlw :VJedia.: A St.a.t.u1ory, Fourth Amendment 
and Fir~t Amendmell1 Analy~is, 28 Sian . L. Rev. 957,957-959 (1976) . 
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a subpoena would afford the newspaper itself an opportunity 
to locate whatever material might be requested and produce it. 
But there is another aud more serious burden on a free press 
imposed by an unannounced police sea.rch of a newspaper 
office: the possibility of disclosure of information received from 
confidential sources, or of the identity of the sources them-
selves. Protection of those sources is necessary to ensure that 
the press can fulfill its constitutionally designated function of 
informing the public/ because importa.r1t information can often 
be obtained only by an assurance that the source will not be 
revealed. Branzburg v. Hayes , 408 U. S. 665, 725-736 (djs-
senting opinion).~ And the Court has recognized tha.t "with-
out some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the 
press could be eviscerated." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 
833. 
Today the Court does not question the existence of this 
constitutional protection, but says only that it is not "con-
vinced ... that confidential sources will disappear and that 
the press will suppress news because of fears of warranted 
searches." Ante, at 17- 18. This facile conclusion seems to 
me to ignore common experience. It requires no blind leap 
of faith to understand that a person who gives information to 
a journalist only on condition tha.t his identity will not ~ 
revealed wil b less likely to give that information if he 
knows that, despite the journalist's assurance, his identity 
1yay in fact be disclosed. And it cannot be denied that con-
~dential inform~.tion may be exposed to the eyes of police offi-
cers who execute a search warrant by rummaging through the 
3 See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 219 ; New York Times Co . v. 
Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 269 ; Grosjean v. American Press C'o. , 297 U. S. 
2:~3 , 250. 
4 Hrcognizing the importancr of lhi~ confidrn1ial rdation:ship, 26 States 
have rnacted so-ca lled "shic lrllaw~" prot rcting rcport rr~. Note, Th <:' News-
man '~ Privilrge Aft rr l3 ranzbw·g: The Cruw for tl F(•deml Shi <'ld Law, 24 
U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 160, 167 n . 41 (1976) . 
.. , ;.,, ·' 
76--1484 & 76-1600--DISSENT 
ZURCHER v. STANFORD DAILY 3 
files, cabinets, desks and wastebaskets of a newsroom.r. Since 
the indisputable effect of such searches will thus be to prevent 
tt newsman from being able to promise confidentiality to his 
potential sources, it seems obvious to me that a journalist's 
access to information, and thus the public' will---thereby be 
impaired.6 
A search warrant allows police officers to ~sack the files of 
a newspaper, reading each and every document until they have 
found the one named in the warr~tnt/ while a subpoena would 
permit the newspaper itself to produce only the specific docu-
ments requ~sted. A search. unlike a subpoena, will therefore 
lead to the needle1s exposure of confidential information com-
pletely un~ed to the purpose of the investigation. The 
knowledge that police officers ca.u make an unannounced raid 
on a newsroom is thus bound to have a deterrent effect on 
the availability of confidential news sources. The end result, 
wholly inimical to the First Amendment, will be a, diminish-
ing flow of potentially important information to the public. 
~In this case, the policemen executing the search warrant were con-
cededly in a position to read confidential material unrelated to the object 
of their search; whether they in fact did so is disputed. 
6 This prospect of lo:sing access to confidential sources may cause report-
er:; to enagage in "self-censor:ship," in order to avoid publicizing the fa.ct 
that they may have confidential information. See New fo1'k Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 275; Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 154. 
Or, journalists may destroy not~s and photograph:; rather than save them 
for reference apd use in future stories. Either of these indirect effects of 
police searche.s would further lessen the flow of news to the public. 
7 The Court says that "if the requirement.., of specificity a11d reasonable-
ness are properly applied, policed and observed" there will be no oppor-
tunity for the polioo to "rummage at large in newspaper files." Ante, at 
17. But in ()rder to find a particular document., no matter how :;pecifically 
it is identified in the warrn.nt, the police will have to search every place 
where it might be-inclncling, presumably, evrry file in the office-and 
to examine each document they find to see if it is the correct one. I thus 
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One need not rely on mere intuition to reach this conclusion. 
The record in this case includes a.ffidavits not only from mem-
bers of the staff of The Sta-pford Daily but from many profes .. 
sional journalists and editors, attesting to precisely such 
persoHal experiellce.8 Despite the Court's rejection of this 
uncontroverted ~yidence, I believe it clearly establishes that 
unannounced police searches of newspaper offices will signifi~ 
cantly burden the constitutionally protected function of the 
press to gather news and report it to the public. 
II 
In Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, the more limited disclosure 
of a journalist's sources caused by compelling him to testify 
was held to be justified by the necessity of "pursuing and 
prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by informants 
and in thus deterring the commission of such crimes in the 
future." 408 U. S., at 695. The Court found tha.t these 
important societal interests would be frustrated if a reporter 
were able to claim a.n absolute privilege for his confidential 
sources. In t.he present c~e, however, the respondents do 
not claim that any of the eyidence sought was privileged from 
disclosure; they claim only that a subpoena would have served 
equally well to produce that evidence. Thus, we are not con-
cerned with the principle, central to Branzburg, that "'the 
public has a right to every man's evidence,'" id., at 688, but 
only with whether any significant societal interest would be 
· impaired if the police were generally required to obtain evi-
s According to these uncontmdicted affidavits, when it becomeH known 
that. a newsman cannot guarantee confidcnt.ialit~' , potential sources of infor-
mat.ion oft.en become unavailable. Moreover, efforts nrr somrtimes made, 
occasionally by force, to prevent reporters and photographers from cover-
ing tww;;worthy events, bec:tusc of fear that the policr. will ;;eize tlw news-
man';,; notes or photograph~ as evidence. The affidavits of the members 
of thf' staff of The Stanford Daily give examples of how this very search 
produced such an impact, on the Da.ily's own journali.~tic functions. 
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deuce from the press by means of a subpoena rather than a 
search. 
It is well to recall the actual circumstances of this case. 
The application for a warrant showed only that there was 
reason to believe that photographic evidence of assaults on the 
police would be found in the offices of The Stanford Daily. 
There was no emergency need to protect life or property by an --immediate searc . The evidence sought was :qat contraband, 
but material obtained by the Daily in the normal exercise of 
its journalistic function. Neither t~e Daily nor any member 
of its staff was suspected of criminal activity. And there was 
no showing the Daily would not respond to a subpoena com· 
manding production of the photpgraphs, or that for any other 
reason a ~ubpoena could not be obtained. Surely, then, a 
subpoena duces tecum would have been just as effective as a 
police raid in obtaining the production of the material sought 
by the Santa Clara Couny District Attorney. 
The District · Court and the Court of Appeals clearly recog-
nized that if the affidavits submitted with a search warrant 
applicatio11 should demonstrate probable cause to believe that 
a subpoentt would be impractical, the magistrate must have 
the author+ty to issue a warrant. In such a case. by definition, 
a subpoen~ would not be adequate to protect the relevant 
societal inf,erest. But they held, and I agree, that a warrant 
should is~4e only after the magistrate has perfor~ed the care-
ful "balai1c[ing] of tpese vital constitutional and societal 
interests." Branzbur(l v. Hayes, supra, at 710 (concurring 
opinion of MR. JusTICE PowELL) .9 
9 The petitioners have arguffi here that in fact there was reason to be-
lieve t:hat the Daily would not. hon9r a subpoena. Regardless of the pro-
bative value of thi~ information, it is irrelevant, since it. was n~t before the 
magistrate when he issued tj1e ' warrant. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U. S. 
560, 565 n . 8; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410, 413 n. 3; Aquilar v. 
'l'exas, 37 U. S. 108, 109 n. I ; see Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 
10, 13-14. 
/ 
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The decisions of this Court establish that a prior adversa~ 
judicial hearing is ge1wrally required to assess in advance a.ny 
~hreatened invasion of First Amendment rights. 10 A search 
by police affords no timely opportunity for such a hearing, 
~ince a search w~rtant is ordinariJy issue~ ex parte upon th~ 
affidavit of a policeman or prosecutor. 'l'here is no oppor-
tunity to challenge th~ necessi~y for ~h~ search until after 
~t has occpred f;L.fl~ the cqn!'ltitutional protection of the news-
paper has been irretrievab~y invad~d. 
On the other h1tng, a Sl,lhpoen{l would !1-llow a newspaper, 
through a motion to quash, an opportunity for an !tdversjlcy 
hearing with resp~ct to the productiqn of any material which 
a prosecutor rn.ight thipk i~ in its possession. This very prin, 
~iple WIJ-S emphasized in the Bran~ burg cas~: 
'
1 [I] f the newsman is called upon to give information 
hearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the 
subject of the investigation, or if he has some other reason 
to believe that his testimony implicates confidential 
source relationships without a legitimate need of law 
enforcement, he will have access to the Court on a motion 
to quash and an appropriate protective order may be 
entered." 408 U. S., at 710 (concurring opinion of MR. 
JusTICE PowELL); see also id., at 707-708. 
lf, in the present case. The Stanford Daily had been served 
with a subpoena. it would have had an opportunity to demon-
strate to the court what the police ultimately found to be 
true-that the evidence sought did not exist. The legitimate 
needs pf government thus would have been served without 
' infringing the freedom of the press. 
to E. g. , United States \'. 'l'hirty-SPven Photooraphs, 402 U. S. 363; 
Carroll v. Princess Anne, a93 0. S. 175 ; Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 
51; cf. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U. S. 496; A Quantity of Copies of 
B ooks v. Kansas,'378 U.S. 205; Marcus v. Search Warrant , 367 U.S. 717. 
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III! 
Perhaps as a matter of abstract policy a newspaper office 
should receive no more protection from unannounced police 
searches than, say. the office of a doctor. But we are here to 
uphold a Constitution. And our Constitution does not ex-
licitly protect the practice of medicine from all abridgment by 
government. It does explicitly protect the freedom of the 
press. 
For these reasons I would affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
fV ,J/ tl/lk . 
~ 
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MR. JuSTICE PowELL, concurring. 
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to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and I write simply to 
emphasize what I take to be the fundamental error of the 
dissenting opinion. As I understand dissent, it would read 
into the Fourth Amendment, as a new and per se exception, 
the rule that any search of an entity protected by the Press 
Clause of the First Amendment is unreasonable. See post, 
at 7. I agree with the Court that there is no cGilstitutional 
basis for such a reading. 
If the Framers had believed that the press was entitled to 
a special procedure, not available to others, when govern-
ment authorities required evidence in its possession, one 
would have expected the terms of the Fourth Amendment to 
reflect that belief. As the opinion of the Court points out, 
the struggle from which the Fourth Amendment emerged was 
that between Crown and press. Ante, at 15. The Framers 
were painfully aware of that history, and their response to it 
was the Fourth Amendment. Ante, at 17. Hence, there is 
every reason to believe that the usual procedures contem-
plated by the Fourth Amendment do indeed apply to the 
press, as to every other person. 
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This is not to say that a warrant which would be sufficient 
to support the search of an apartment or an automobile neces-
sarily would be reasonable in supporting the search of a 
newspaper office. As the Court's opinion makes clear, ante, 
at 16, 17, the magistrate must judge the reasonableness of 
every warrant in light of the circumstances of the particular 
case, carefully considering the description of the evidence 
sought, the situation of the premises, and the position and 
interests of the owner or occupant. While there is no justifica-
tion for the establishment of a separate Fourth Amendment 
procedure for the press, a magistrate asked to issue a warrant 
for the search of press offices can and should take cognizance 
of the independent values protected by the First Amendment-
such as those highlighted by the dissent-when he weighs such 
factors. If the reasonableness and specificity requirements are 
thus applied, the dangers perceived by the dissenting opinion 
are likely to be minimal. Ibid. 
In any event, considerations such as thesfl are the province 
of the Fourth Amendment. There is no authority either in 
history or in the Constitution itself for exempting certain 
classes of persons or entities from its reach.* 
*An example of the harm that might. follow adoption of a per se rule 
banning searches of the press is furnished by respondent's announced 
policy of destroying any pl1otographs that might aid prosecution of pro-
testors. Appendix 118, 152-153. At oral argument., counsel for respond~ 
ent stated that this policy conceivably could have extended to the destruc~ 
tion of evidence of any crime: 
"QUESTION: Let us assume you had a picture of the commission of a 
crime. For example, in banks they take pictures regularly of, not only 
of robbery but of murder committed in a bank and there have been pic~ 
tures taken of the actual pulling of the trigger or the pointing of the gun 
and pulling of the trigger. There is a very famous one related to the 
assassination of President Kennedy. 
"What would the policy of the Stanford Daily be with respect to that? 
Would it feel free to destroy it at any time before a subpoemt had been 
.served? 
"MR FALK: T·he--UteraUy read, the policy of the Daily requires mJ~ 
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to give an affirmative answer. I find it hard to believe that in an examplt> 
such as that., that the policy would have been carried out. It w;u; not 
addressed to a picture of that kind or in that context. 
"QUESTION: Well, I am sure you were right. I was just getting to 
the scope of your theory. 
"MR. F ALK: Our-
" QUESTION: What is the difference between the pictures Justice 
Powell just described and the pictures they were thought to have? 
"MR. FALK: Well, it simply is a distinction that-
"QUESTION: Attacking police officers iutead of the President. That 
is the only difference." 
While the existence of this policy was not before the magistrate at the 
time of the warrant's issuance, 353 F. Supp. 124, 135 n. 16 (ND Cal. 1972), 
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r join the opinion of the Court. and I write simply to 
emphasize what 1 take to be the fundameutal error of the 
dissenting opinion. As I understand the dissent. it would read 
into the Fourth Amendment. as a new and per se exception. 
the rule that any search of an entity protected by the Press 
Clause of the First Amendment is unreasonable so long as a 
subpoena could bp used as a substitute procedure. Even aside 
fro Ill the clifficul ties in vol vcd in deciding on a case-by-case 
basis whether a subpoena can serve as an adequate substitute/· 
1 For PxamplP, rr;.;pondrnt had announcPd a policy of dr~troying 11ny 
photcgraph~ th;1t might aid pro:-<<'eution of prot<•stor><. App. lHl, 152-15:3. 
Whilr thi:-; policy probably rPfiectPd t-he drPp frPling~ of thP ViPtnam rnt, 
and onr may as~;umr that undPr normal circumstanee~< few, if any , pn•;;;; 
rntit ir;.; would adopt a policy :-;o ho~t ilr to l:tw rnforcrm<>nt, rP:-<poliCIPnt'i:l 
policy at lra"t illu~tndr" thr po:-<;-, ihilit~· of :-<uch ho:-<tilit~· . (T~p of il sub-
porna, a:-; propo"rd by the di;.;:-;rnt would be" of no utility in farr of a 
policy of clP;.;troying pvidrncP. And unlP:s:-< tlw poliey wrn• publici~· an-
nounr<'d, it probnbly would bP diflieult to ,.;how thr imprartiealit~· of a 
s nbpoe"na a~ oppo~rd to a ,.;parrh warr;lllf.. 
At oral ar~umrJlt, rmm,.;rl for rr:-<pondrnt sfatPd that the annolmrPd 
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T agree with the ( 'ourt that tlwre is no constitutional basis for 
such a rea eli ng. 
If the Franwrs had believed that the press was entitled to 
a special procedure. not availabk to others. when govern-
ment authorities required evidence in its possession. one 
would have expected the terms of the Fourth Amendment to 
reflect that belief. As tht> opinio11 of tlw Court points out. 
the struggle froltl which the Fourth An1endment emerged was 
that between Crown and press. A1de, at 15. The Frarners 
were painfully av.-are of that history. and tlwir response to it 
vvas thP Fourth Amendment. A 11 te, at 17. Hence. there is 
rvery reason to lwli<>ve that tlw usual procedures contt>m-
policy of tlw Stanford Daily <·onct•ivabl~· ('ould haH· extrlH!rd to the 
drstruct iu11 of r\·id<'ll<'<' of auy <'l'imr.: 
"QUESTION: Let u~ n::>~Uill(' you had a pici un· of the eonnni::;siou of n 
crime. For rxamplr, in banks thry take picture~ regularly of, nut only 
of robbery but of murder commiited in a bank and then· havt-' bee11 pic-
ture,; takrn of the ;;dual pulling of tlw t riggt>r or thr pointi11g of the gun 
and pulling of the trigger. Th<·re i~ a \'Pr~· famou::; Oil(' rplatPtl to the 
assal:lsination of Pre::;idPnt. KennPdy. 
"What would thr policY of thr 8tanford Daily hP with rPspPct to that? 
Would it ferl frre to deHtroy it at an.\· time brforr a ~ubpo<'lln had bren 
~ervrd? 
"MR. FALK: T·he-literally rrad, thr policy of the Daily require,; me 
to give an affirmativr am;wrr. I find it. hard to brliPve that in aJJ rxample 
;;uch as that .. that. the policy would have bern carried out.. It was not 
addressed to a picture of that kind or in that contpxt. 
"QUESTIOJ'\: Wrll, l am :i\lfe you were right. 1 wai:i just getting to 
thr i:iCO])(' of your theory . 
"MR. FALK: Our-
·'QUESTION : What i::; thr ditl'erPncr lwtwpen thr picture;; .Justice 
Powell ju;;t de~cribed and the picture,.; they were thought to have'? 
'·~m .. FALK : Well, it :;imply i;; n di::;tinction that-
"QUESTION: Attncking polirr officer" illlead of the PrP;;iclf'nt. That 
is thr only ditfrrf'nrr ." 
Whilr the Pxi::;tence of thi" policy wa.~ not. brforf' the mngi;;trate at the 
time of the w:urant';; i;;;;wmcc, 35;3 F. Supp. 124, 135 n. 16 (ND Cal. 1972), 
it. illu~t ra tr~ t.hr pos,.,ihle dangrr;; of crrating ::;rparate ~t andarcb for the 
J.lf<'S:j a)OJIC' , 
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plated by the Fourth Amendment do indeed apply to the 
press, as to every other person. 
This is not to say that a warrant which would be sufficient 
to support the search of an apartment or an automobile neces-
sarily would bP reasonable in supporting the search of a 
uewspaper office. As the Court's opinion makes clear. ante, 
at 16, 17. the magistrate must judge the reasonableness of 
every warrant in light of the circumstances of the particula.r 
case, carefully considering the descriptioll of the evidence 
sought. the situation of the premises, and the position and 
interests of the owner or occupant. While there is no justifica-
tion for the establishment of a separate Fourth Amendment 
procedure for the press, a magistrate asked to issue a warrant 
for the search of press offices ca11 and should take cognizance 
of the independent va.lurs protected by the First Amendment--
such as those highlighted by the dissent-when he weighs such 
factors. If thr reasonableness and particularity requirements 
are thus applied. th<• dangers perceived by the dissenting opin-
ion are likely to be minimal." lb1:d. 
In any event. considerations such as these are the province 
of the Fourth Amendment. There is 110 authority either iu 
history or in the Constitution itself for exempting certain 
classes of p0rsons or entities from its reach. 2/ 
" l.VIorro\'Pr. thrn· i~ uo rra~on wh~· police• ollirrr~ PX('('tt1 ing a warrant 
~houJcJ not ~f'('k tJw ('00Jl('J':l(.ion of th(' ~IIIJjp{'t part~· , in Ol'df'r to jlfPVE'Ilt 
needlr.;~ di~rupt ion . 
. . , .. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
On Writs of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and I write simply t(} 
emphasize what I take to be the fundamental error of the 
dissenting opinion. As I understandJ dissent, it would read 
into the Fourth Amendment, as a new and per se exception, 
~ the rule that ff!!:)L search of an entity protected by the Press 
Clause of the First Amendment is unreasonable> ~ee ~88t; 
~I agree with the Court that there is no constitutional 
_,/ b~fs for such a reading. 
If the Framers had believed that the press was entitled to 
a special procedure, not available to others, when govern-
ment authorities required evidence in its possession, one 
would have expected the terms of the Fourth Amendment to 
reflect that belief. As the opinion of the Court points out, 
the struggle from which the Fourth Amendment emerged was 
that between Crown and press. Ante, at 15. The Framers 
were painfully aware of that history, and their response to it 
was the Fourth Amendment. Ante, at 17. Hence, there is 
every reason to believe that the usual procedures contem-
plated by the Fourth Amendment do indeed apply to the 
press, as to every other person. 
-
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This is not to say that a warrant which would be sufficient 
to support the search of an apartment or an automobile neces-
sarily would be reasonable in supporting the search of a 
newspaper office. As the Court's opinion makes clear, ante, 
at 16, 17, the magistrate must ju'dge the reasonableness of 
every warrant in light of the circumstances of the particular 
case, carefully considering the description of the evidence 
sought, the situation of the premises, and the position and 
interests of the owner or occupant. While there is no justifica,-
tion for the establishment of a separate Fourth Amendment 
procedure for the press, a magistrate asked to issue a warrant 
for the search of press offices can and should take cognizance 
of the independent values protected by the First Amendment-
such as those highlighted by the dissent-when he weighs such 
factors. If the reasonableness and ~f!J~ei~ity requirements are p~or·Lc.• .. dart'f7 
thus applied, the dange~er.ceived by the dissenting opinion 
. are likely to be minimal. Ibid. A 
In· any event, considerations such as thes~ are the province 
of the Fourth Amendment. There is no authority either in 
history or in the Constitution itself for exempting certain 
classes of persons or entities from its reach.' '2.-
*An example of the harm that might follow adoption of a per se rule 
banning searches of the press is furnished by respondent's announced 
,; ·policy of destroying any photographs that might aid prosecution of pro-
testors. Appendix 118, 1.12-153. At oral argument., counsel for respond~ 
ent stated that this policy conceivably could have extended to the destruc~ 
tion of evidence of any crime: 
"QUESTION: Let us assume you had a picture of the commission of a 
-crime. For example, in banks they take pictures regularly of, not only 
-of robbery but of murder committed in a bank and there have bE'en pic-
tures taken of the actual pulling of the trigger or the pointing of the gun 
-and pulling of the trigger. There is a very famous one related to the 
.assassination of President Kennedy. 
"What would the policy of the Stanford Daily be with respect to that? 
Would it feel free to destroy it at any time before a subpoena had been 
.served? 
"MR FALK:: The-literally read, the policy of the Daily requires me 
76-1484 & 76-1600 (A) 
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to give an affirmative answer. I find it. hard to believe that in an example 
such as that., that the policy would have been carried out. It was not 
acldressed to a picture of that kind or in that context. 
"QUESTION: Well, I am sure you were right. I was just getting to 
the scope of your theory. 
"MR. F ALK: Our-
" QUESTION: What is the difference between the pictures Justice 
Powell just described and the pictures they were thought to have? 
"MR. FALK: Well, it simply is a distinction that-
"QUESTION: Attacking police officers intead of the President. That 
is the only difference." 
While the existence of this policy was not before the magistrate at the 
time of the warrant's issuance, 353 F. Supp. 124, 135 n. 16 (ND Cal. 1972), 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
On Writs of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and I write simply to 
emphasize what I take to be the fundamental error of the 
dissenting opinion. As I understand.Ldissent, it would read 
\ into the Fourth Amendment, as a new and per se exception, 
~- ue rule that )illJI search of an entity protected by the Press 
Clause of the First Amendment is unreasonabl~ Sgg ~Iii~ 
, ~ I agree with the Court that there is no constitutional 
basis for such a reading. _ , 
If the Framers had believed that the press was erl.titled to 
a special procedure, not available to · others, when govern-
ment authorities required evidence in its possession, one 
would have expected the terms of the Fourth Amendment to 
reflect that belief. As the opinion of the Court points out, 
the struggle from which the Fourth Amendment emerged was 
that between Crown and press. Ante, at 15-. The Framers • 
were painfully aware of that history, and their response to it 
was the Fourth Amendment. Ante, at 17. Hence, there is ' 
every reason to believe that the usual procedures contem-
plated by the Fourth Amendment do indeed apply to the 
press, as to every other person. · 
' . 
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~espondent had announced a policy of destroying 
any photographs that might aid prosecution of protestors, 
however crimical tlxieir oondu.st---m·i~t-be f.. App. 118, 
152-153. While this policy probably reflected the deep 
feelings of the Vietnam era, and one may assume that under 
normal circumstances few, if any, press entities would 
adopt a policy so hostile to l.efjitimat~aw enforcement, 
{ r~f~"'~ P''~':}lc 
tbl~a~ at least illustrates the possibility of such 
hostility. Use of a subpoena, as proposed by the dissent, 
would be of no utility in face of a policy of destroying 
evidence. And unless the policy were publicly announced, 
it probably would be difficult to show the impracticality 
of a subpoena as opposed to a search warrant. 
At oral argument, counsel for respondent stated 
that the announced policy of the Stanford Daily conceivably 
could have extended to the destruction of evidence of ~gy 
crime: 
-
-· •• ... ,I 
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This is not to say that a warrant which would be sufficient 
to support the search of an apartment or an automobile neces-
sarily would be reasonable in supporting the search of a 
newspaper office. As the Court's opinion makes clear, ante, 
at 16, 17, the magistrate must judge the reasonableness of 
every warrant in light of the circumstances of the particular 
case, carefully considering the description of the evidence 
sought, the situation of the premises, and the position and 
interests of the owner or occupant. While there is no justifica,-
tion for the establishment of a separate Fourth Amendment 
procedure for the press, a magistrate asked to issue a warrant 
for the search of press offices can and should take cognizance 
of the independent values protected by the First Amendment~ 
such as those highlighted by the dissent-when he weighs such 
factors. If the reasonableness and~ requirements are f'u·ti 'vl(.lf.'tfy 
thus applied, the dangers perceived-by the -dissenting opinion 
are likely to be minimaiP Ibid. 
· - In any event, considerations such as these are the province 
of the Fourth Amendment. 'There is no authority either in 
history or in the Constitution itself for exempting certai 
classes of persons or entities from its reach.~ 
~ililoW~>!!e8!M~•-t~~!@lolifl'l'8iiiio-oiil-oiwoli•Loi.llUliiooOil6lliililQll•~' a eunce 
olicy of destroying any photographs that might aid--JY!'lJ'§ecution of pro 
estors. AppPndix 118, 152-153. at oral- argument., counsel for rPspond 
e~t stated that this. policy. cbhce~vably could have extended to thP destr -
"QUESTION: Let us assume you had a picture of the commission of a 
crime. For example, in banks they take pictures regularly of, not only 
of robbery but of murder committed in a bank and there havE' bPen pic-
tures taken of the actual pulling of the triggpr or the pointing of the gun 
and pulling of the trigger. There is a very famous one related to the 
assassination of President, KennPdy. 
"What. would the policy of the Stanford Daily bP with respect. to that? 
Would it feel free to destroy it at any time before a subpoPna. had been 
.served? 
"MR. F ALI<: The-literally rPad, the policy of the Daily rPquires ml:l 
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to give an affirmative answer. I find it. hard to believe that in an example 
such as that., that the policy would have been carried out.. It was 11ot 
addressed to a picture of that kind or in that context. 
"QUESTION: Well, I am sure you were right. I was just getting to 
the scope of your theory. 
"MR. F ALK: Our-
" QUESTION: What is the difference between the pictures Justice 
Powell just described and the pictures they were thought to have? 
"MR. FALK: Well, it simply is a distinction that-
"QUESTION: Attacking police officers intead of the President. That 
is the only difference." 
While the exi~:~tencr of this policy wa~> not before the magistrate at the 
time of the warrant's issuance, 353 F. Supp. 124, 135 n. 16 (ND Cal. 1972), 
it illustratrs the possible danger~ of creating separate standards for the 
press alone, 
.' 
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The Stanford Daily et al. 
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The Stanford Daily et al. 
[May-, 1978] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
On Writs o'f Certiorari 
to the United .States 
Court of Appeals for 
.the Ninth Circuit. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and I write simply to 
emphasize what I take to be the fundamental error of ~ 
dissenting opinion. As I Ulldersta.nd ~he di~wt, it would read 
into the Fourth Amendment, as a new and per se exception, 
the rule that any sea.rch of an entity protected by the Press 
·Clause of the First Amendment is unreasonable so long as a 
subpoena could be used as a substitute procedure. Even aside 
. from the difficulties involved in deciding on a case-by-case 
basis whether a subpoena can serve as an adequate substitute,' 
t For example, respondent had announce.cl a policy of destroying any 
photographs that might, aiel pro:;ecution of protestori:l. App. 118, 152-153. 
While this policy probably reflected the deep feeling:; of the Vietnam era, 
and one may a::;sume that under normal circum:;tance:s few, if any, press 
entities would adopt a policy so hostile to law t>nforcement, respondent's 
· policy at. least illn:;t.ra.tt·:o: t)l(l possibility of such hostility. Use of a sub~ 
poena , as proposed by the dissent would be of no utilit~· in face of a 
policy of destroying evidence. And unlrss the policy were publicly an-
nounced, it. probably would br difi-lcult t.o show the impra.ctjcality or a 
:subpoena as opposed to a search warrant .. 
At oral argument, coun~el for re:spond.ent stated that the announced 
76-1484 & 76-1600-CONCUR (A) 
2 ZURCHER v. STANFORD DAILY 
agree with the Court t.hat there is no constitutional basis for 
ch a reading. 
ffthe Framers had believed that the press was entitled to 
a special procedure, not available to others, when govern-
ment authorities required evidence in its possession, one 
would have expected the terms of the Fourth Amendment to 
reflect that belief. As the opinion of the Court points out, 
the struggle from which the Fourth Amendment emerged was 
that between Crown and press. Ante, at 15. The Framers 
were painfully aware of that history, and their response to it 
was the Fourth Amendment. Ante, at 17. Hence, there is 
every reason to believe that the usual procedures contem-
policy of the Stanford Daily conceivably could have <•xtrndrd to the 
destruction of evidence of any crime.: 
"QUESTION: Let us a;;;;ume you had a picture of t·hl:' commission of a 
crime. For example, in banks they take pictures rl:'gnlarly of, not only 
of robbery but of murder committed in a bank a11d there have been pic-
tures taken of the actual pulling of the trigger or thl:' pointing of the gun 
and pulling of the trigger. There is a very famous one related to the 
assassination of President. Kennrdy. 
"What would the policy of the Stanfm·d Daily be with respect. to that'! 
Would it feel free to destroy it at any time before a subpoena had been 
served? 
"MR. FALK: The-literally read, the policy of the Daily requires me-
to give an affirmative answer. I find it hard to believe that in an example-
such as that., that the policy would have bl:'en carried out. It was not 
addressed to a picture of that kind or in that context. 
"QUESTION : Well, I am sure you were right. I was just getting to 
the scope of your theory. 
"MR. FALK : Our-
"QUESTION: What is the difference between the pictures Justice 
Powell just described and the pictures they were thought to have? 
"MR. FALK: Well, it simply is a distinction that-
"QUESTION: Attacking police officers intead of the President. That 
is the only difference." 
While the existence of this policy was not before the magistrate at the 
time of the warrant's issuance, 353 F. Supp. 124, 135 n. 16 (ND Cal. 1972), 
it illustrates the possible dangers of creating separate standa):ds for ~he 
pres~S. .alone. 
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·plated by the Fourth Amendment do indeed apply to the 
press, as to every other person. 
This is not to say that a warrant which would be sufficient 
to support the search of an apartment or an automobile neces-
sarily would be reasonable in supporting the search of a 
newspaper office. As the Court's opinion makes clear, ante, 
at 16, 17, the magistrate must judge the reasonableness of 
every warrant in light of the circumstances of the particular 
case, carefully considering the description of the evidence 
sought, the situation of the premises, and the position and 
interests of the owner or occupant. While there is no justifica-
tion for the establishment of a separate Fourth Amendment 
procedure for the press, a ma.gistrate asked to issue a warrant 
for the search of · press offices can and should take cognizance 
I 
he independent values protected by the First Amendment-
such as those highlighted by tile aietnt=-when he weighs such 
factors. If the reasonableness and particularity requirements 
are thus applied. the dangers pereeived e.y..the EliBE!eB~ing~"' 
.~~~~are likely to be mi11imaP Ibid . ..__ 
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In any event, considerations such as these are the province 
of the Fourth Amen.dment. There is no authority either in 
history or in the Constitution itself for exempting certain 
classes of persons or e11tities from its reach.8 
oreover, there is no reason why police officers executing a warrant 
should not ~eek the cooperation of the subject party, in order to prevent 
needless disruption. 
a ~e eli&l'!llt qnl ho~ he concurring opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes, 
408 U. S. 665, 709-710 (1972) (POWELL, .J., concurring), '8>J Oi*f18rtin~ 
the view that the Fourth Amf'ndment contains an implied except.ion for 
the press, through the operation of the Firi:it Amendment. , . 
"fhe IJJ 811Mal>1tr~ concurrence legcL llA 6?1~]18Pt te thid u ie Yi~ ~ noted only 
that. in considering a mohon to qua~h a subpoena directed to a newsman , 
the court ~hould balance the competing value:s of a frf'e press and the 
societal intere:;t in df'tecting and prosecuting crime. Thf' concurrence 
expre~S::;ed no doubt as to the applicability of the subpoena procedure to 
member~; of the press. Hather than advocating the creation of a ;;pecial 
proci>d.ural exception for tlw press, it approved reeognition of Fir~t Amend-
76-1484 & 76- 1600-CONCUR (A) 
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ment conct>rns within the applicablt> procedure. The COIH'Ilrring opmwn 
may, however, properly be read a:-; ~upporting thP view c•xprt>s:-;ed in the 
text above, and in thE• Court's opinion, that. under the warrant requirt'-
ment of the Fourth Amendment. the magistral<• :-;hould consider the valut>:; 
of a free press as well as the ::>ocictal interel:it in enforcing tht> criminal laws. 
Insert for Zurcher 
Although the First Amendment does not, ex proprie 
~MrraR&&9 s&a•eR a per se barrmer to searches 
proper under the Fourth Amendment, it does provide 
an independent source of constitutional protection 
for the press and other speakers that the magistrate 
should consider in determining the reasonableness 
of a particular warrant application and making provision 
for the particularity requirement of the Warrant 
Clause. 
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The Stanford Daily et al. 
[May -, 1978] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
On Writs of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and I write simply to 
emphasize what I take to be the fundamental error of the 
dissenting opinion. As I understand the dissent, it would read 
into the Fourth Amendment, as a new and per se exception, 
the rule that any search of an entity protected by the Press 
Clause of the First Amendment is unreasonable so long as a; 
subpoena could be used as a substitute procedure. Even aside 
from the difficulties involved in deciding on a case-by-case 
basis whether a subpoena can serve as an adequate substitute,r. 
1 For example, respondent had announced a policy of destroying· any 
photographs that might aid prosecution of protestors. App. 118, 152-153:.. 
While this policy probably reflected the deep feelings of the Vietnam era, 
and one may assume that under normal circumstances few, if any, press 
entities would adopt a policy so hostile to law enforcement, respondent's 
policy at least illustrates the possibility of such hostility. Use of a sub-· 
poena, as proposed by the dissent would be of no utility in face of a 
policy of destroying evidence. And unless the policy were publicly an-
nounced, it probably would be difficult to show the impracticality of a 
subpoena as opposed to a search warrant. 
At oral argument, counsel for respondent st.ated that the announced 
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I agree with the Court that there is no constitutional basis for 
such a reading. 
If the Framers had believed that the press was entitled to 
a special procedure. not available to others. when govertl-
ment authorities required evidence in its possessiou. one 
would have expected the terms of the Fourth Amendment to 
reflect that belief. As the opinion of the Court poi11ts out. 
the struggle from which the Fourth Amendment emerged was 
that between Crown and press. Ante, at 15. The Framers 
were painfully aware of that history, and their respoiJse to it 
was the Fourth Amendment. Ante, at 17. Hence. there is 
every reason to believe that the usual procedures coutem-
policy of the Stanford Daily concrivabl.v could havr extrndrd to the 
destruction of rvidPnCP of any crimP.: 
"QUESTION: Let u::; a::;o~umr you had a picture of thP commi::;siou of a 
crime. For examplP, in banks they take pictures regularly of, not only 
of robbery but of murder committed in a bank and therP have been pic-
tures taken of the actual pulling of the trigger or the pointing of the gun 
and pulling of the trigger. ThPre is a very famous Oilt' related to the 
assassination of President. KennPcly. 
"What would the policy of the Stanford Daily be with respect to that? 
Would it feel free to destroy it at any time before a t:mbpoena. had been 
served? 
"MR. F ALK: The-literally read, the policy of the Daily requires me 
to give an affirmative answer. I find it. hard to believe that in an example 
such as that, that the policy would have been carried out.. It was not 
addressed to a picture of that kind or in th<Lt context. 
"QUESTION: Well, I am Hure you were right. I was just getting to 
the scope of your theory. 
"MR. FALK: Our-
·'QUESTION: What is the diifNence between the pictures Justice 
Powell just deHcribed and the pictures they were thought. to have? 
"MR. FALK: Well, it simply is a distinction that-
"QUESTION: Attacking police officers intead of the PresidPnt. That 
is tlw only difference." 
While the existence of thiH policy wa<> not before the magistrate at the 
time of the w:urant's issuance, 353 F. Supp. 124, 135 n. 16 (ND Cal. 1972), 
it. illustrates the possible danger;, of creating separate ::>tandards for the 
prrs~ alone, 
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tjlated by the Fourth Amendment do indeed apply to the 
press, as to every other person. 
This is not to say that a warrant which would be sufficient 
to support the search of an apartment or an automobile neces-
sarily would be reasonable in supporting the search of a 
newspaper office. As the Court's opinion makes clear, ante, 
at 16, 17, the magistrate must judge the reasonableness of 
every warrant in light of the circumstances of the particular 
case, carefully considering the description of the evidence 
sought, the situation of the premises, and the position and 
interests of the owner or occupant. While there is no justifica-
tion for the establishment of a separa.te Fourth Amendment 
procedure for the press, a magistrate asked to issue a warrant 
for the search of press offices can and should take cognizance 
of the independent values protected by the First Amendment-
such as those highlighted by the dissent-when he weighs such 
factors. If the reasonableness and particularity requirements 
are thus applied. the dangers perceived by the dissenting opin-
ion are likely to be min imaP I b1:d. 
In any event, considerations such as these are the province 
of the Fourth Amendment. There is no authority either in 
history or in the Constitution itself for exempting certain 
classes of persons or entities from its reach. 
2 Moreover, there is no reason why police officers executing a warrant. 
should not seek the cooperat.ion of the iSilbjeet party , in order to prevent 
needlP:;;.~ di:mtption. 
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Rider in Zurcher, p. , new footnote --/: 
~ I The dissent quotes the concurring opinion in 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709-710 (1972) (POWELL, 
J., concurring), in support of the proposition that the 
Fourth Amendment must be read as containing an implied 
exception for the press, through the operation of the 
First Amendment. Post, at 5,6. The Branzburg concurrence 
supports no such proposition. It noted only that in 
considering a motion to quash a subpoena directed to a 
newsman, the court should balance the competing values of 
a free press and the societal interest in detecting and 
prosecuting crime. The concurrence never expressed doubt 
that the supoena procedure was legitimately applied 1'~ 
members of the press. Far from advocating the creation of 
special procedural exceptions for the press, it approved 
of the recognition of special First Amendment concerns 
within the clearly applicable procedure. Hence, that 
opinion is properly read as support for the proposition 
here put forward: in attempting to apply the relevant 
procedure here, the warrant requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment -- the magistrate is bound to consider the 
conflicting values of a free press and the societal 
interest in apprehending criminals. 
!.1'. •' 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
On Writs of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
.the Ninth Circuit. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and I write simply to 
emphasize what 1 take to be the fundamental error of the 
dissenting opinion. As 1 understand the dissent. it would read 
into the Fourth Amendment. as a new and per se exception, 
the rule that any search of an entity protected by the Press 
·Clause of the First Amcndmeut is unreasonable so long as a 
subpoena could be used as a substitute procedure. Even aside 
from the difficulties involved in deciding on a case-by-case 
basis whether a subpoena can serve as an adequate substitute,' 
1 For C'Xamplr, rr:>pondent hnd nnnouncr.d n policy of dPstroying any 
photograph::: that might aid pro~ecution of prote:::tor~. App. lUI, 152-153. 
Whilr thi,.; policy probably rd-lreted t-llP deep frrling::: of the ViPtnam era, 
and onr may n,.;:sumr that under normnl circum,.;taner:; few, if any , pres~; 
entitie:s would adopt a policy ,.;o hostile to law enforcPment, re:;pondcnt's 
policy at lea:;t illu,.;t rat(':; tlw po,.;:;ibilit~· of such ho:;tilit~·. u~e of a. sub-
porna , a,.; propo,.;ed by thr di~::;ent would hf' of no utilit~· in fncc of a 
policy of destroying evidcncP. And unlPss the poli(·~· wrre publicly an-
nounced, it probabl~· would br difticult to ,.;how the impraeticality of a 
subpoena ns opposed to a :;parch warrant .. 
At oral argumPnt, coun::;el for re::;pondent stated that the almonnccd 
76-1484 & 76-1600-CONCUR (A) 
2 ZURCHER v. STANFORD DAILY 
I agree with the Court t.hat there is no constitutional basis for 
such a reading. 
If the Framers had believed that the press was entitled to 
a special procedure, not available to others, when govern-
ment authorities required evidence in its possession, one 
would have expected the terms of the Fourth Amendment to 
reflect that belief. As the opinion of the Court points out, 
the struggle from which the Fourth Amendment emerged was 
that between Crown and press. Ante, at 15. The Framers 
were painfully aware of that history, and their response to it 
was the Fourth Amendment. Ante, at 17. Hence, there is 
every reason to believe that the usual procedures contem-
policy of the Stanford Dail~· concrivabl~· could have <·xtendt>d to the 
destruction of t>vidence of any crimt>: 
"QUESTION: Let us asJSume you had 11 pictt1rr of t-he commission of a 
crime. For example, in banks they take picture:s regularly of, not only 
of robbery but of murdt>r committed in a bank and tht>re hnvt> been pic-
tures taken of the actual pulling of the 1 riggt>r or the pointing of the gun 
and pulling of the trigger. Tht're i::; a ver~· famouR one related to the 
assassination of President Kennt>cly. 
"What would the policy of the Stanfm·d Daily be with respect to that? 
Would it feel free to destroy it at any time before n subpoena. had been 
served? 
"MR. FALK: T-he-literally read, the policy of the Daily requires me 
to give an affirmative answer. I find it. hard to believe that in an example 
such as that., that. the policy would have been carried out. It was not 
addressed to a picture of that kind or in that context. 
"QUESTION: Well, I am sure you were right. I was just getting to 
the scope of your theory. 
"MR. F ALK: Our-
"QUESTION: What is the difference between the pictures Justice 
Powell just described and the pictures they were t-hought to have? 
"MR. FALK: Well, it simply is 11 distinction that-
"QUESTION: Attacking police officers intead of the President. That 
is the only difference." 
While the existence of this policy w11s not before the magistrate at the 
time of the warrant's issuance, 353 F. Supp. 124, 135 n. 16 (ND Cal. 1972), 
it illustrates the possible dangers of creating separate standards for the 
pres& .aJ.oue. 
76-1484 & 76-1600-CONCUR (A) 
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plated by the Fourth Amendment do indeed apply to the 
press, as to every other person. 
This is not to say that a warrant which would be sufficient 
to support the search of an apartment or an automobile neces-
sarily would be reasonable in supporting the search of a 
newspaper office. As the Court's opinion makes clear, ante, 
at 16, 17, the magistrate must judge the reasonableness of 
every warrant in light of the circumstances of the particular 
case, carefully considering the description of the evidence 
sought. the situation of the premises, and the position and 
interests of the owner or occupant. While there is no justifica-
tion for the establishment of a separate Fourth Amendment 
procedure for the press. a magistrate asked to issue a warrant 
for the search of press offices can and should take cognizance 
of the independent values protected by the First Amendment-
such as those highlighted by the dissent-when he weighs such 
factors. If the reaso11ableness and particularity requirements 
are thus applied. the dangers perceived by the dissenting opin-
ion are likely to be minimaL:! Ibid. 
In any event, considerations such as these are the ptovince 
of the Fourth Amendment. There is no authority either in 
history or in the Constitution itself for exempting certain 
classes of persons or entities from its reach.3 
2 Moreover, there is no reason why police officers executing a warrant 
should not seek the cooperation of the subject party, in order to prevent 
needless disruption. 
a The dissent quotes from t·he concurring opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes, 
408 U. S. 665, 709-710 (1972) (PowELL, J., concurring), as supporting 
the view that the Fourth Amendment contains an implied except.ion for 
the press, through the operation of the First Amendment. Post, at 5, 6. 
The Bmnzburg concurrence lend::; no support to thi:s view. It noted only 
that. in considering a motion to quash a subpoena directed to a newsman, 
the court should balance the competing values of a free press and the 
societal interest in detecting and pro!:>ecuting crime. The concurrence 
expre:ssed no doubt as to the applicability of the subpoena procedure to 
members of the press. Hat her than advocut ing the creation of a special 
procixlural exception for the pres::;, it approved recognition of First Amend-
76-1484 & 76--1600-CONCUR (A) 
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ment concern,: within the applicablE' procrdm·e. ThP cow·urring opm10n 
may, howt'ver, properly be read a,~ ~upporting the virw expms:<ed in the 
text. above, and in t·he Court':; opinion, that. under tlw WHrrant rt'quire-
ment. of the Fourth Amendment , the magi ·trate :<honld consider the values 
of a free pres:; as well u:; the societal intere:st in enforcing the criminal law:;. 
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I join the opinion of the Court, and I write simply to 
emphasize what I take to be the fundamental error of the 
dissenting opinion. As I understand th<' dissent. it would read 
into the Fourth Amendment, as a new and per se exception, 
the rule that any search of an entity protected by the Press 
·Clause of the First Amendment is unreasonable so long as a 
subpoena could be used as a substitute procedure. Even aside 
from the difficulties involved in deciding on a case-by-case 
basis whether a subpoena can serve as an adequate substitute,' 
1 For examplf', rf'~pondent hAd announcC'.d a policy of destroying any 
photograph:,: that might a id pro~ecution of prote;;ton;. App. 118, 152-ls:J. 
Whilf' thi~ policy probably rdkcted t·hf' dPep fprlingl:i of the Vietnam f'ra, 
and onf' ma~· ~~~~umf' that undrr normal circum,;tances few, if any, pre~:;~ 
entitie~ would adopt a policy ,;o ho!itilf' to Ia\\' f'nforcemrnt, respondent's 
'policy at )pa ~t iiJn><tratP>< th(• JlOiiliibiJit~ · Of liUCh ho~tiJity . U~c· of H. SUb• 
popna, ali propo~ed by thr di~rnt. would bP of no utilit~· in face of a 
policy of drst roying evidr neP . And unl<'~li the poli('~· were publicly an-
nounced, it probabl~· would bP diflicult to ,;how th(' impntctica lit~· of a 
subpo<'nn. AS opposed to a sPa rch warrant .. 
At oral argument , coun:;el for r<>:.;pond('nt :;tated that the a.tmounced 
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I agree with the Court that there is no constitutional basis for 
such a reading. 
If the Framers had believed that the press was entitled to 
a special procedure, not available to others, when govern-
ment authorities required evidence in its possession, one 
would have expected the terms of the Fourth Amendment to 
reflect that belief. As the opinion of the Court points out, 
the struggle from which the Fourth Amendment emerged was 
that between Crown and press. Ante, at 15. The Framers 
were painfully aware of that history, and their response to it 
was the Fourth Amendment. Ante, at 17. Hence, there is 
every reason to believe that the usual procedures contem-
policy of the Stanford Dail~· concrivabl~· could have c•xtmdrd to the 
destruction of evidener of any crime: 
"QUESTION: Let us a;;~umr ~·ou had a picturr of the commission of a 
crime. For example, in banks they take picture~ regularl~· of, not only 
of robbery but of murder committed in a bank and there have bern pic-
tures taken of the actual pulling of the trigger or the pointing of the gun 
and pulling of thr trigger. Thrrr i~ a ver~· famou;;; one related to the 
assassination of President. Kennedy. 
"What would the policy of the Staujo1'd Daily be with respect. to that'! 
Would it feel free to destroy it at any time beforr a subpoena. had been 
served? 
"MR. FALK: The-literally read, the policy of the Daily requires me 
to give an affirmative answer. I find it. hard to believe that in an example 
such as that., that the policy would havr bren carried out. It was not 
addressed to a picture of that kind or in that context. 
"QUESTION: Wrll, I am sure you were right. I was just getting to 
the scope of your throry. 
"MR. FALK: Our-
"QUESTION: What is the clifferencr brtween the pictures Justice 
Powell just described and the pictures they were thought to have? 
"MR. FALK: Well, it simply is a distinction that-
"QUESTION: Attacking police officers intead of the President. That 
is the only difference." 
While the existence of this policy was not before the magistrate at the 
time of the warrant's issuance, 353 F. Supp. 124, 135 n. 16 (ND Cal. 1972), 
it illustrates the possible dangers of creating separate ~:;tandards for ilie 
presa .a.loue. 
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'plated by the Fourth Ameudment do indeed apply to the 
press, as to every other person. 
This is not to say that a warrant which would be sufficient 
to support the search of an apartment or an automobile neces-
sarily would be reasonable in supporting the search of a 
newspaper office. As the Court's opinion makes clear, ante, 
at 16, 17, the magistrate must judge the reasonableness of 
every warrant in light of the circumstances of the particular 
case, carefully considering the description of the evidence 
sought. the situation of the premises. and the position and 
interests of the owner or occupant. While there is no justifica-
tion for the establishment of a separate Fourth Amendment 
procedure for the press, a magistrate asked to issue a warrant 
for the search of press offices can and should take cognizance 
of the independent va.Iues protected by the First Amendment-
such as those highlighted by the dissent-when he weighs such 
factors. If the reasonableness and particularity requirements 
are thus applied. the dangers perceived by the dissenting opin-
ion are likely to be minimaL:! Ibid. 
In any event, considerations such as these are the province 
of the Fourth Amendment. There is no authority either in 
history or in the Constitution itself for exempting certain 
classes of persons or entities from its reach. 3 
2 Moreover, there is no reason why police officers executing a warrant 
should not ~eek the cooperation of the subject party, in order to prevent 
needless disruption. 
3 The dissent quotes from the concurring opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes, 
408 U. S. 665, 709-710 (1972) (PowELL, .J., concurring), as supporting 
the view that the Fourth Amf'ndment contains an implied except.ion for 
thr press, through the operation of the First Amendment. Post, at 5, 6. 
The Branzburg concurrence lend~ no ~upport to thi~ view. It noted only 
that. in considering a motion to quash a subpoena directed to a newsman , 
the court should balance the competing value~:; of a free press and t·he 
societal intere~;t in detecting and prosecuting crime. The concurrrnce 
expre~:sed no doubt as to the applicability of the subpoena procedure to 
members of the prc:;s. Hat her than advocating thr crPation of a ::;pecial 
prod'dural exception for thr preHs, it approved rrcognition of Firt>t Amend-
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ment concern,: within the applicabl!:' procPdurr. Tlw roll<'lll'ring opmwn 
may, howPver, properly be r!:'ad a>' supporti nJ?; th<· view <·xpr<•:;:<ed in the 
text above, and in the Court'~> opinion, that under flw warrant n•<.juire-
ment of the Fourth Amendment. tlw magi:;tratr :<hould consider the ndur" 
of a free press m; well a,: thE' ::;orietal intE>re:<t in enforcing the criminullaw:;. 
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: Bob DATE: May 23, 1978 
RE: JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT IN STANFORD DAILY, No. 76-1484 
Justice Stevens' dissent in this case criticizes the 
Court for failing to adopt a completely novel view of the 
Fourth Amendment that was neither argued nor discussed at 
Conference. While his theory is interesting and has some 
appeal in terms of its ultimate results, this strikes me as 
another example of heedlessness to the institutional claims 
of the Court. 
Justice Stevens wants a partial return to the era 
before Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). That was the 
case which overturned the ancient distinction between "fruits, 
instrumentalities, and contraband" and "mere evidence." It held 
that the Fourth Amendment guarantee was directed to privacy, rather 
than property, and made the point that the intrusion into the 
subject's privacy is the same no matter what the nature of the 
property sought. Justice Stevens correctly notes that when 
the property distinction was overturned, the number of persons 
whose privacy might be invaded V-a a Fourth Amendment search was 
vastly increased, since it now included innocent third parties 
holding what used to be thought of as "mere evidence." 
In order to protect that interest, Justice Stevens is 
forced to look outside the Fourth Amendment, for it draws no 
qualitative distinction between the invasion of the criminal's 
privacy and that of the supposedly innocent person. Hence, he 
turns to the Due Process Clause (Dissent p. 7.) , declaring that 
"the innocent citizen's interest in the privacy of his papers 
and possessions is an aspect of liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That interest 
is safeguarded by the right to a prior hearing, Which can be 
dispensed with, says Justice Stevens, only if probable cause 
for an unannounced search is clearly made out. It is made out, 
only if there is reason to believe that the subject will aestroy 
of conceal the evidence. This will be true onlymere the subject 
is himself the crook, or where there is a strong inference of 
connection to the crime, as in a search for the weapons or fruits. 
Notice that this is a somewhat novel view of the Due Process 
Clause. Traditionily, we think of the Fourth Amendment -- or 
perhaps the First -- as repositories of the privacy guarantee. 
The notion that privacy is part of the liberty guarantee of 
tre Due ~rocess Clause comes pretty much out of thin air, although 
it has a certain appeal. 
In sum, I think that Justice Stevens' approach is interesting, 
but it may be doctrinal overkill. Once it is conceded that a 
third-party's privacy interest melts away when he is in possession 
of weapons, fruits, etc., it is hard to see what additional interest 
is at stake when a "mere document" is sought. If only the inference 
of criminal culpability -- and therefore suspicion of readiness to 
destroy -- increases with the nature of the evidence, then we simply 
could view the problem as one within the Fourth Amendment itself--
if the officers must go up to the attic of an innocent third 
party and rifle through the private, documents gathered over the 
course of his lifetime in order to recover a single document 
in a tax fraud case, we we~l might say that the requested search 
would be unreasonable. 
Thus, I see no reason why, in the next case down the 
road, you would be prevented from reaching a result similar 
to that of JPS by following a Fourth Amendment analysis. Perhaps 
an insert in footnote 2 would not hurt: 
·· r c tc.. 
"Similarly, the magnitude of a proposed search 
directed at aqy third party, together with the nature and 
significance of the material sought, are factors 
properly considered as bearing on the reasonableness 
and particularity requirements." 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
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I join the opinion of the Court. and T write simply to 
emphasize what I take to be the fundamental PJTor of MB. l 
JusTICE Sn~wAt·ds disS<'Ilting opinion. As l understand that 
opinion, it would rPad in to the Fourth Ame1Hinwnt. as a n<'w 
and per se exception. Hw rul<.' that any search of an <'Jltity 
protected hy the Press Claus<' of the First Anwndment is un-
reasonable so long as a subpoena could be used as a substitute 
procedure. EvPn aside from the difficulties involved in tl<'cid-
ing on a case-by-case basis whether a subpoena can St'rw as 
an adequate substitute. 1 T agn•c with the Court that th<'r<' is 
no constitutioDal basis for uch a readi11g. 
1 For rxamplr, re;;pondcnt hnd unnotmrrd :1 polic~· of clP><tro~·ing any 
photo~raph,; th:d might aid prosecution of protP~ ton< . App. 111', 152-15:3. 
While thi ~ policy probably rrfl<·ctrd t·h<' dN•p fpp]ing~ of thr \'iptnmn <·rn, 
and one may u;;sume that undPr normal eircumstaners few, if an~·, ]ll'<'~~ 
entit iPs would adopt a polir~ · ~o ho~t ilr to law <•nforr<·ment, rrspondrnt 's 
polir~· at ](':tsl illustrate•,; the po~~ihilit ,\' of ~urh ho~tilit~· . l},;(' or :l sub-
l)O('Jla , ~~~ propo:srcl h~ · thr dif'~Pnt . would br of no utility in J'arr of a 
policy of d0:; troying evidc·nct'. And unl<'~~ the poli<·y wrn• publicly nn-
nounred , it. probably would b0 diflieulf to ~how the impraeticnlity of a 
subpo<'nn 11s oppos<-'d to a ~ra rrh warrant. 
At, oral argumrnl, coun;;rl for rr~pondcnt l'tnt<>d that t-he nnno11nrcd 
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Tf the Framers had believed that the press was en titled to 
a special procedure, not available to others, when govern-
ment authorities required evidence in its possession, one 
would have expected the terms of the Fourth Amendment to 
reflect that belief. As the opinion of the Court points out, 
the struggle from which the Fourth Amendment emerged was 
that between Crown aml press. Ante, at 15. The Framers 
were painfully aware of that history, and their response to it 
was the Fourth Amendment. Ante, at 17. Hence, there is 
every reason to believe that the usual procedures contem-
plated by the Fourth Amendment do indeed apply to the 
press, as to every other person. 
policy of the Stanford Daily concrivahly could have extended to the 
destruction of evidence of any crime: 
"QUESTION: Let us as:;ume you lwd a picture of the commission of a 
crime. For example, in banks they take pictures regulnrly of, not only 
of robbery but of murder committed in n bank and there have been pic-
tures taken of the actual pulling of the trigger or tlw pointing of the gun 
and pulling of the trigger. There is a very famous one related to the 
assassination of PresidenL Kennedy. 
"What would the policy of the Stanford Daily be with respect to that? 
Would it feel free to drstroy it at any time before a subpoena. had been 
served? 
"MR. FALK: The-literally read, the policy of the Daily requires me 
to give an affirmative answer. I find it. hard to believe thnt in an example 
such as that, that the policy would have been canied out. JL was not 
addressed to a picture of that kind or· in t ha.t context. 
"QUESTION: Well, I am ~;me you were right. I was just getting to 
the scope of ~·our theory. 
"MR. F ALK: Our-
" QUESTION: What is the diiTerencr between the pictures Justice 
Powell just described :md the pictures they were thought to have? 
"MR. FALK: Well, it simp]~· is a distinction that-
"QUESTION: Attacking policr officers intritd of the President. That 
is the only difference." 
While the existence of this policr was not before the magistrate at the 
time of the warrant's issuance, 353 F. Supp. 124, 135 n. 16 (ND Cal. 1972)~ 
lL illustrates the possiblr dangers of creating :;eparate standards for the 
·press alone. 
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This is not to say that a warrant which would be sufficient 
to support the search of an apartment or an automobile neces-
sarily would be reasonable in supporting the search of a 
newspaper office. As the Court's opinion makes clear, ante, 
at 16, 17. the magistrate must judge the reasonableness of 
every warrant in light of the circumstances of the particular 
case, carefully considering the description of the evide11ce 
sought. the situation of the premises, and the position and 
interests of the owner or occupant. While there is no justifica-
tion for the establishment of a separa.te Fourth Amendment 
procedure for the press, a magistrate asked to issue a warrant 
for the search of press offices can and should take cognizance 
of the independent values protected by the First Amendment-
such ae those. highlightPd by Mn . .Ju::>TICE Sn;wAHT-when he \ 
weighs such factors. lf the reasonableness and particularity 
requirements are thus applied. the dangers arc• likely to be 
minimal." Tb·id. 
In any event, considerations such as these are the province 
of the Fourth Amendment. There is uo authority either in 
history or in the Constitution itself for exempting certain 
classes of persons or entities from its reach.'1 
~Similarly, the magiJituclc of n propo::;cd ~rHrch dirrrtrd HI any third I 
part.\·. togrthrr with tlw nat.mr and ::~ignificanc<' of IIH• matNiHI ,,ought. 
nrc f:wtors properly con;;idNrd a~ !waring on tlw rrasotwblrtH'"~ and par-
t ieulari t ~· n•qui rrtw•n (~. \f orro,·er, t hPn· i~ no rPa~on why policP oflict'r" 
rxrcuting <1 W<ll'l':illl should not st'ck tlw <'OOJlNHtion of thP ~uhjt•ct part~·, 
in ordPr to prrv<'nt twrdlt·~" disruption. 
"Thr coneurring upi1tion in Branzbw·Q "· Hayes. 408 ·u. S. (ifl5, 709- \ 
710 (1972) (PowgJ,t., .T.. roneurring), doP::i Hot ,;uppurt tht• virw that th<' 
Fomth Anwndnwnt ccntain~ an implird <'Xe<'ption for t·lw pn•s;:;, through 
th<' opNation of tl!P Fir~t Amrnclment. That opinion noted only that in 
eon~idrring a motion to qu;t;,;h a iiubpot·lla dirretPcl to a Iww~mttll, thr 
court should b;ilanrt• t lw l'Omprt ing val uP" of a fret' Jlff'"" and the 
socirtal intrrcst in drtrcting and prosecuting crime. Thr conrunrncr 
rxprr;;Hcd no doubt flii to thr ttpplicability of thr ~>ubpoPntt procrdurf' to 
nwmbrr::; of the pre""'. Rathrr than advocating the crration of a ~prcia l 
procrdural rxcrption for thr press, it approvrd rrcognition of Fir:-;( Am(•ll(l-· 
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4 ZURCHER v. STAKFOHD DAILY 
mcnt couecrtt>< within thr applicablr procrdurr. Thr cotH'UITing optnton 
may, howrvcr, proprrly bP read ws supporting the virw expr<'~~:<rd iu the 
text above, nnd in t·hc Court's opinion, that undrr thr warrant require-
ment. of the Fourth Amendrnrnt, thr magil:'trnte ;should cono;idrr the valurs 
of a frre pre·:;~ ns well a~ the societal interest in enforcing the criminal Jaws. 
2 4.· MA'< 1978 
3rd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
Nos. 76- 1484 AND 76-1600 
James Zurcher, Etc., et al., Petitioners, 
76-1484 v. 
The Stanford Daily et al. 
Louis P. Bcrgna, District Attorney, 
and Craig Brown, Petitioners, 
76- 1600 v. 
The tanford Daily et al. 
[May -, 1978] 
MR. J us·rrcE PowELL, concurring. 
On Writs of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and T write simply to 
emphasize what 1 take to be the fundanwntal PITor of MH. \ 
JUSTICE ~TIO:.WAH'l'S diSSPn ting opinion. .\.s f U ndNstand that 
opinion. it would rPad into the Fourth :\nwndmPnt. as a new 
and per se exception. thP ruk that any search of an Pntity 
proteetPd by the Press ClauS(' of tlH• First Amf'ndment is un-
reasonahl<:' so long as a subpoena could bf' used as a substitute 
procf'clun-'. Evf'n aside from the difficulties iJIVolvf'd in decid-
ing on a case-by-case basis wlwtlwr a subpoena can s<'t'vt• as 
an adequate substitut<'.' 1 agn•e with the Court that tlwn' is 
no constitutional basis for such a rf'ading. 
1 For rxamplr, rP,;pondrnt hnd nnnourw<•rl a polic~· of dr,;tro)·ing any 
photograph~ that might aid pro,;rrution of protP~tors. App. 111', 152-15:~ . 
WhiiP thi:-; policy probably rrflretrd 1·hr drPp fprling~ of thr YiPtnnm rrn, 
and onP may ns~urnr that under normal !'irctnnstnner~< frw, if an~·, ]Jrrss 
rntitif•s would adopt 11 polir~· ~o hosrilr to .law rnforr<'mPnt, rrspondrnt':s 
policy at l<•ast illustm tr,; t hr po~~ihilit~· of :Sll<'h ho~t ility. u~r of a ~ub­
porna, m.: Jll'Opo;;rd h~ · thr dis;wnt. would br of no utilit.\· iu facP of a 
policy of dr~troyin~ rvidence. And uniP~s thP poli<·y wrn• publicly an-
notli1<'Pd , it. probably would br ditritult to ~how the imprnrtieality of a 
suhpo<'nn 1\H opposrrl to a "rn rrh \\'arrant . 
At oral argumrnt , roum;rl for rrspondrnt sta (('d that thr anno11nrrd 
76-1484 & 76-16QO-CONCUR (A) 
2 ZURCHER v. STANFORD DAILY 
Tf the Framers had believed that the p1·ess was entitled to 
a special procedure, not available to others, when govern-
ment authorities required evidence in its possession, one 
would have expected the terms of the Fourth Amendment to 
reflect that belief. As the opinion of the Court points out, 
the struggle from which the Fourth Amendment emerged was 
that between Crown and press. Ante, at 15. The Framers 
were painfully aware of that history, and their response to it 
was the Fourth Amendment. Ante, at 17. Hence, there is 
every reason to believe that the usual procedures contem-
plated by the Fourth Amendment do indeed apply to the 
press, as to every other person. 
policy of the Stanford Daily concPivahly could have extended to the 
destruction of evidf>nce of any crimr: 
"QUESTION: Lrt us assume you had a picture of the commission of a 
crime. For example, in banks they take pictun>s regularly of, not only 
of robbery but of murder committed in a bank a.ncl there have been pic-
tures taken of the actual pulling of the trigger or the pointing of the gun 
and pulling of the trigger. There is a very famous one related to the 
assassination of President Kennedy. 
"What would the policy of the Stanfo1'd Daily be with respect to that? 
Would it feel free to destroy it at an~' time before a subpoena. had been 
served? 
"MR. FALK: T·hc-literally read, the policy of the Daily requires me 
to give an affirmative answer. I find it hard to believe that in an example 
such as that, that the policy would hnve been carried out. It was not 
addressed to a picture of thnt kind or in that context. 
"QUESTION: Well, I am !illl'e you were right . I was just getting t() 
the scope of ~·our theory. 
"MR. FALK: Our-
"QUESTION: What is thr di-fference between the pictures Justice 
Powell just described and the pictures they were thought to have? 
"MR. FALK: Well, it simp!~· is a distinction that-
"QUESTION: Attar king police officers intead of the President. That 
is the only difference." 
While the existrnce of thi!i polic~· was not before the magistrate at the 
time of the warrant's issuance, 353 F. Supp. 124, 135 n. 16 (ND Cal. 1972), 
jt, illustrates the possiblr dangers of creati.ng !ieparate standards for the 
·pres& alone, 
76-1484 & 76-1600-CONCUR (A) 
ZURCHER v. STANFOHD DAlLY 3 
This is not to say that a warrant which would be sufficient 
to support the search of an apartment or an automobile neces-
sarily would be reasonable in supporting the search of a 
newspaper office. As the Court's opinion makes clear. ante, 
at 16, 17. the magistrate must judge the reasonableness of 
every warrant in light of the circumstances of the particular 
case, carefully considering the description of the evidence 
sought. the situation of the premises, and the positio11 and 
interests of the owner or occupant. While there is no justifica-
tion for the establishment of a separate Fourth Amendment 
procedure for the press. a magistrate asked to issue a warrant 
for the search of press offices can and should take cognizance 
of the independent va.lues protected by the First Amendment-
such a::. those highlighted by MR. Jv~:>TICE STEWAHT-whe11 he \ 
weighs such factors. If the reasonableness and particularity 
requirements are thus applied. the dangers an• likely to be 
minimal." Tb·id. 
In any event, considerations such as these are the province 
of the Fourth Amendment. 'There is no authority either in 
history or in the Constitution itself for exempting certain 
classes of persons or entities from its reach.'1 
2 Similarly, thr m:tgllitudc of a propo;;rd ~rHreh direct<•d at any third l 
]iart~·. togr1her with tlw uat.urr and signif]cancr of thr matrrial ~011gh1. 
nrc fnet .on; prop<'rly con;;idt>rrd a.• bra ring on 1 he· n·a~ona blrnP~~ ami pn r-
ticularit~· rr4uin•nwnts. \forro1·rr, thPrr is 110 rea:;on why polic<> ofhet•r"' 
rx<>cuting 11 warrant should not sPPk the cooperation of tlw subjl'rt party, 
· in ordl'r t.o prev<•ni needlt·~s disruption. 
a Thr con<'nrring opinion in Brauzburo Y. Hayes, 408 U. R. ti05, 709- \ 
710 (1972) (PoWELL, J. , concurring), dor~ uot support tlw virw that thf' 
.Fourth Anwndtnf'llt conU1ins an implird exception for thr press , through 
tlw opPratiou of the First Ampncfnwnt. That opiniou notc·d only that in 
con~i<IPring; n motion to qua~h n ~ubpot-na dirPetrd to a llPW~man, ihr 
comt ~honld balancr ihr cornpr1ing valur~ of a frr<· prr~,; nml tho 
societal intrrest in drtrrting and pro:ecuting crimr. Thr concunrncr 
rxprr~~f'd no doubt a:; to the applicability of the :;ubpm·na prorf'dnrf' to 
nwmbers of the pre~s . Rather than advocating the crration of a ;;pecial 
procedural excrption for the press , it approved recognition of Fir~t Amencl-
76-1484 & 76-1600-CONCUR (A) 
4 ZURCHER v. STANFOHD DAILY 
ment concerns within thr npplicablr procedurr. The concurring opllllOn 
may, howrver, proprrly be• rrad a~ supporting the virw rxpres~ed in the 
text above, and in the Court's opinion, that under thr warrant rrquire-
ment of the Fourth Amendment , the mngi:;tmle ~hould consider the values 
of a free pr<·~s Hs well as the societal interest in enforcing the criminal laws. 
CHAMeERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.§nprtmt <qourt of tqt ~b .§fattg 
Jfrur!ringhtn. ~. <!f. 2llc?~~ 
May 30, 1978 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: (76-1484 Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily 
(76-1600 Bergna v. _The Stanford Daily 
Through some mischance the print shop included 
in this case the concurring opinion which I had "killed." 
This will be corrected before it comes down tomorrow. 
Again I will not be present today and probably 
not tomorrow since on my trip to Alabama I developed 
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.. ·COurt Backs 
EaS~d, Rule · . _, 
Ort,s·~arches · 
' .. j .. - • • ~ 
~ ~u~~, ·.· .. ? ·..: ~,A-:·~ ~:---., , ." .:<.\. , .. . . J 
:"·'Jlai(i:on News Office: ~\ 
.... ~- .... - • ·' . ... - .. ~ .·-· '"-, l> .• ~- • • • • •. l 
~34.~ Stanf'ord Upheld . 1 
~~~y S~t~-3 D~_cis~o:ti · :. j 
t,J..-'~ ! .'• -
:-·:?:""' jy Morton Mintz- ··· 
,._ q .·-:: Washington Post StRf! . Writer 
· '· '-'T.Qe Supreme Court ruled 5 to 3 
~ ye'sterday that police can get ~ar-
1. 1 r~:~tii' to make una n n 0 u n c ;e d" 
' searches 0~ places . _;_' including 
' n'ewsrooms ~ owned 'or occupied 
, 'bY,J>_et;sons believed tQ be ~!?--~c:ent 
of -cririlinal .activities. ,. , . \' 
;:.:The .;court ' 'act-ed:' m 1• .a •) California I 
newspaper case that -pitted the' !Justice . 
Department·· and . law enforcement 
gr{)ups ·against . a· dozen · national press· 
organizations of, among others, pub-
lishers, broadcasters, editors, report- ' · 1 
er_s, and unions. .· · · · · . j 
"The critical element In a reasona-=::. · ·. 
' ' '' ble search is not that the owner of the --'·' 
· ,;·~ property is suspected of crime· but c 
1 ' , that there is reasonable cause tu be-
. t lieve that the specific 'things' to be 
searched for and seized are located Pn 
the property," Justice Byron R. White ... 1 
· . .!. r ~- wrote in tlie opinion for the court. · ·,. He said that "it is untenable t9' con- j elude that property maY · ·not · be 
searched unless.its occupant is reason-· 









to ·arrest." ' '· 
But in' a dissenting opinion, Justice 
Jolin Paul · 'Stevens warned of 
"extremely serious'" consequences for ,. 
"c(ni'ntless law-abiding citizens" who 
may possess papers relating to an on-
going criminal investigation, such ·a,s 
"d()ctors, lawyers, merchants, custom- . 
ers,' bystanders ..• " ···. -· ~ '. · · · 
In the second dissenting opinion, 
. Justice Potter Stewart, joined by Jus-
tice 'Thurgood Marshall, wrote: 
"Perhaps as a matter 9f abstract 
policy a newspaper office should re-
ceive no more protection from unan- · 
nounce'd police searches than, say,. the 
office of a doctor or the office of ' a 
bank. . , . 
"' 'But' we are here to uphold a Con-
stitution. And our Constitution does 
not : explicitly protect · the practice . of 
medicine or the business of banking 
· fr9m all abridgement by government."• . 
It;9oes explicjtly protect 'the freedom ·. 
of. the press."-
;rustice-LeWis F. Powell Jr., a mem-
ber. of the majority, replied that if the 
frwers of the .Bill of Rights had be- -
lieved ' 1that the press was entitled to 
a special procedure, not available to 
others, when government authorities ' 
reqUired evidence in its possession, 
oqe would have expected the terms of 




The Reporters Committee for Fre-e-' 
dom ·of the Press called the ruling 
1 "a-constitutional outrage" and said 
the Carter administration "must share 3 I 
1 :. tht;_ blame" because Solicitor General 
:.-' ~ I w a_!le IJI,' McCree _urged the court ' to 
ti rule ~uch as 1t_ d1d. _., '. ,~ : -: 1 
J, · . ·. See SEARCH;A'7, Col.« r•~ : ··i 
·~ ' ~' .. ' ,t ... ,;t .... ...,__,.: ·~ ,~,... .... -·--'··'" .. ... t '"\ .•. :·~~--.. 'I 
Rule on Searc es 
Backed by CoUrt 
SEARCH, From Al 
(Attorney Ge~eraf Griffin Ji: B~ll told 
a-recent m~eting o{ the American Society 
of Newspaper Editors that he planned to · 
try to make federal requirements for ob-
taining warrants involving the press as 
stringent as those -for subpoenas for docu· 
ments.) 
Prominent editors condemned the de-
cision. 
Associated Press· President Keith F·uuer 
said it "could open the doQr to harass-
ment" by local officials "irritated over 
news coverage." Los Angeles Times editor 
Bill Thomas termed it 'incredible" and 
"terrible." San Francisco Examiner editor 
Reg Murphy called it "a disaster" for the 
public. - · 
Benjamin C. Bradlee, executive editor 
of The Washington Post, said, 'How the 
majority can conclude that the 'threat and 
the fact of police searches of newspaper 
offices doesn't strike freedom of the press 
a crippling blow is beyond understanding." 
He continued: · 
"The Pentagon Papers could ·never.bave · 
· been published. The police would have 
entered newspaper •Offices ·and : seized 
them, before newspapers cou~d bring the 
facts to the people. If this decision were 
in force during Watergate, it requires no 
stretch of the imagination to see police in 
' these offices on a fishing expedition for 
Messrs. Nixon, Mitchell, Haldeman, 
Ehrlichman, and :company. 
"The requirement of a warrant is no 
~eal prote for the. government can 
to issue a warrant." 
dangers to the press because a 
magistrate asked to issue a warrant for a 
search of press offices "can and should 
take cognizance of , the independent 
values protected by . the F:irst Amend-
ment.'' 
Citing that admonition, · constitutional 
law Prof. Gerald Gunther of StanfOTd Uni-
versity warned the press that by proclaim-
ing the decision a total defeat, it "may 
create a self.fulfilling prophecy' by lead-
ing magistrates to treat newspapers as no · 
'l.... t1;1:fP:rPr1t. from else. 
officers of the Palo Alto Police Depart· 
ment and the Santa Clara County Sheriff's 
i[)epartment of the offices of the Stan-
ford Daily, the Stanford University student 
newspaper, in 1971. , 
"This raid . . • was not an isolated in-
cident but repres~nts a new and increas-
ingly popul8l" police tactic againts the 
press,' Jack C. Landau, director of the re-
porters committee,. said. 
"Police raids on news offices hav~ oc-
curred about 10 times in California, in· 
eluding four simultaneous raids conducted 
last December by police on four San 
Francisco-area TV stations," Landau said. 
"It happened last September to a TV sta-
tion in Rhode Island, and only three weeks 
ago police raided the AP bureau in Helena, 
Mont." 
The Stanford Daily search was triggered-
by the occupation of offices in the univer-
sity hospital by demonstrators who, armed 
with sticks and Clubs, attacked and injured 
nine officers stationed at one end of the 
hall adjoining the offices. 
Two days later, the Daily ~arried photos 
· indicating that a staff photographer 'might 
have made pictures of the assault. Officers 
· then secured a warrant .to search the 
- -- -·- ..........._.. _ _.. _ - ..... _ _. __ ..ll __ _ ,__ 
.. . .. 
Photos by The Stanford DaUf~ 
Police officer examines film strips during 1971 se_arch of_ Stanford University ne;f.paper~~~ : ,, . 
Policeman goinr· through material during 1971 search of U:e Stanforcl ·Daily offices. ""' 
' . . - ~ . .;; 
--.:. ..J,;_ - '- --. ---~' .. ~ I ( ~-- _ __!_~ 
I '• 
-~ 
:.,;,,' .. •: 
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J =y':'!~;: fr~m-w:·~~ · Alt~":J~!~ ;;;~ ·· ·-----··------. - .-•. ~,~~·~··-···--:~--·.--·7·~,~ · 
fouhd "juSt probable and reasonable cause" . · existed i~ the Supreme Court, any other . evideQce if. notified of what ··t~e' poll~~~ 
' to believe that developed and undeveloped · federal court, . or the Federat' Rules of · . wanted. • . · · · •· · · · · .;;., 
film need to identify the assailants "will Crl·m· a1 p d J d. · · h ·, . i.rt'£' , . . m roce ure. . u ge Peckham . held t ta : when F" · ; 
be located'' at the newspaper. · 
Later in the day, four officers went ~ to "Under existing law, valid warrants may- Amendment interests are involved, "'~ "' 
' be issued to search any property • • at search is permissible "only 'in the rare ~ 
the Daily ·where, Justice White wrote, they · · · White said. "Search warants are not ·di· cirmumstances wbere there is a clear sho•~~ 
' searched its "photographic laboratories, h' ·h · " h · n-·" w 1c there is probable cause to believe lng t at evidence will be removed 01'"" 
filing cabinets., desks, and wastepaper bas- that ... evidence of a crime will be found,'~ destroyed an da restraining order "'outd'·.· 
· kets ... The officers apparently had op- b .u. search of 'places' and the seizure of e futile. · . · • · ·.~·, 
portunity to read notes and correspondence · d 1· ' ·.y, 
during the search." The se'arch revealed ' recte at persons; they authorize the'' White, rej~ctin~ fears such as the dcyin(: 
only that the :revelant I photos already had! · 'things.' · • ·" up of confidential sources if warrantS:· 
been published. 'Disagreeing, Justice Stev~ns said that In replace subpoenas, said that magistrate(. 
The Daily and several ·of its staff then a "misconstruction of history," White mis- have "ample tools ... to confine warrant&-. 
filed a civil · lawsuit accusing those in- read the Fourth Amendment clause pro- to search within reasonable limits." .:~ 
volved in the search and the judge of . tecting "papers" ' against unreasonable Justice Stewart replied that such "facile""' 
having violated their constitutional rights. · searches. "It is unlikely that the authors . assurances "ignor.e common experience;'.!: 
U.S. District Court Judlge Robert F. Peck- expected private papers ever to be among . He ,said that a confidential news story"": 
ham ruled• for the newspaper in an opinion the 'things' that could be .seized with a source will be less likely to supply infor-. 
adopted by t'he 9th U.S. Circuit Court of warrant," he wrote. mation if he knows \t may be seen o:v.·; 
I Appeals. · White also 1 wrote that the amendment policeman "rummaging· ,· through files ~· 




bars issuance o fa search warrant· in the and public need," and that there is "no room" with a warrant enabling them "to~ 
case of an innocent third party unless a occasion" for a court to try to strike a new ransack the files, reading each ' and everY.~ 
sworn affidavit presents · probable cause balance by insisting that investigators pro- . ?ne until they .~ave found the one nam~.~~ 
to believe that a document subpoena is ceed with a less intrusive document sub- 1D the warrant. · .. , .. 
impracticable, and unless it appears that poena giving .third parties advance notice. "The en dresult, wholly inimical to tlie . 
the third party would remove or destroy White also said that third parties who First Amendment, will be a diminishin( 
· the evidence in violation of a court order. may seem blameless actually may not be, flow of potentially important information'. 
• In the opinion, reversing the courts be- and, if subpoenaed, may connive in having . to the public," Stewart said. , · ~ ~ 
low, Justice White said that Peckham had evidence disappear. · Justice Stevens said '' · Justice Willi~iri ·J . . Brennan Jr., who w;s . 
made a "sweeping revision of the Fourth that the Stanford Daily Warrant made ill when the case \was argued did not~ 
Amendment" . for which no precedent no claim that the paper would destroy participa~e: . _ ' 
'-
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T HE SUPREME COURTS decision upholding the ment would then have acquired information that no .. - power of" government to search a newspaper of- : court would have authorized it to obtain. 
fice for documentary evidence. of soPJ,eone else's We do not yet know what effect the decision will 
crime is a staggering blow' to freedom· of th.e press. 'have· on the ability of ne~s media to obtain confiden-
What is more, the impact of the decision will be al-. ' t~arinf~rmation of any kind. But we· share the dis-
most as heavy on the rights of all citizens. What the_.·. quiet of J.ustice Potter Stewart, who wrote in his dis-
court has said is that if the police can convince a sent, "It requires no blind leap of faith to understand 
·judge there is probable cause to believe evidence. of a that a person who gives ·information to a journalist 
. crime is contained in your private' files-a crime not · only_ on condition that ,his identity will not be re-
committed by you but by anyone, anytime, anywhere vealed will be less likely to give that information if he 
..:.:..they can rummage through your papers and prem- · knows that, despite the journalist's assurance, his 
ises until they find it, or choose. to abandon the identity may in fact be disclosed." The majority of 
~arch. Previously, it could be argued that the polic~ the court, while grudgingly granting a reporter's 
· could bnly ask for that evidence or get a court order right to keep confidential intormation in some situa-
requiring you to produce it. ,tioris, has. now made it unsafe for him to keep that in.:: 
: This assault stands on 'its head the history of both formation any place but in his head. · 
the First and Fom:tn Amendm~nts. Both additions to · · . While the· problems/of confidentiality may ,not be 
the co·nstitution· grew out of long battles between· the as great for most private citizens as they are for the I 
pJess and the British Crown, which had, used search news media, they do arise." There is little reason to - ~ 
warrants to seek evidence of seditious libel. Until a · think the court will be any more generous, in its han-
decade ago, the Fourth Amendment was thought to ·· dling of the privacy of a doctor's ·confidential files-
guarantee that the private papers ofanyone-diaries, . o\ those of any other citizen-than it has been with 
for example-were always immune ·from the prying the press's. If the police can convince a judge that the 
eyes of government. And until yesterday's court deci-. picture you took of the Washington Monument has in 
~}~n it had be~n far from clear that the government :it evidence of, say, a · purse snatching (even if you 
~!>uld invade those private papers to obtain evidence aren't aware of it), they can obtain \l warrant to enter 
of a crime committed by someone. other than their your home and dig it out of your desk-looking at all 
owner. · the other pictures that are there, in the process. 
~· ·The effect of this decision on the operation of the .· · The co~rt, w~ile refusing to find any distinction 
news media in this country could be dramatic.· In a . petween the problems its decisioQ. causes for news-
. s1~uation like Watergate, . for examp~e, · .a .n;ewspaper' papers and for other citizens, did note that judges 
(or its reporters) would be foolish to retain documen- should be especially careful in issuing warrants to 
. tai-y evidence that might reveal the sources of its in~ . search news-media offices. "Properly administered, 
formation. Had this decision ·been . in 'place · before the preconditions for a warrant ... should afford sur-
Watergate, it is not hard to imagine the ·conditions ficient protections against the harms that are assert-
under which some judge could have beeri convinced edly threatened ... ," Justice Byron White wrote. 
this newspaper had evid.ence ·of some criin~per- But even if all the judges in the nation were as sensi-
na:'ps totally unrelated to Watergate-in its·files .. Once tive to issues of personal privacy and freedom of the 
<!,"warrant to search ·for that· evidence i:1ad been is- press as are 'some members of the court (which they 
sp~d. the way would have been open for investigato~ aren't), this decision would represent a vast grant of 
to look at everything in the files until' they found it. If, discretionary power for government to invade the 
· in the process, they happened to come across by acci- privacy of American citizens, and as such is a terrible 
; : de,nt the nam~s o~ the Watergate sources, the goy ern-:;, ·set~~.ck to indivi~ual ~nd press freedom. 
I· . 






By An~hot1y Lewis 
WASHINGTON, June 7--When the 
Supreme Court last week unheld the 
right of the police to make a surprise 
se-arch of The Stanford Daily, newspa-
pers were alarmed. Editors called the 
decision "disastrous" and " jur,t plain 
awful." A lawyl!r charp,c•d the Court 
·.;. · with a "n<uvc refusal to rC'cognize ~he 
importance of the press :n tl,is coun-
~ ·· try." 
f.
{:.\ The panic reacrion was understand- · 
able, but it seems to me mistaken -·r·'- ~ 
,. ·: for two reasons. What was actually 
':~· ;_' said by the Justices in the majority 
~: was not so novel or shattering. And the 
threat that does lie in the Stanford 
~{ · .. case is not to the press alonr. Doctors, 
. ~·.·~:; lawyers and others m ay fear unrl!a-
_::. r. sonably intrrlsive police searches 
, . ,:, through their files. 
} :· It is a funclamenta! mistake, I think, 
I
J :( for the press to argue that it 1s entitled 
.;;:. to different and better treatment ·r. under the Constitution. The First 
~·< Amendment also protects the right of 
;~ :.·.··;.:_ professors and pamphleteers and ordi-
t·~-- nary CllJzens to wnte and speak freely. 
f:1'; .. - On the specific issue of sParciles, 
·~~~ there is no historical basis whatever 
.;:~, for thinking that the press is exempt 
.:.·. from the Fourt!1 Amendment's war-
; ·" x-ant proredure. And logicnlly, chould 
·,.:' · a newspaper be exempt il it hiis phySi· 
''·" cal evidence of a crime- a gun, say, 
CJ··~· or a blood-stdined shirt? Much as one 
.: ·' ,; may worry about any official intrusion 
.~f:.{: into newspapers, Justice Stewart 's at-
~·.,.:. tempt in his Stanford dissent to put the 
,, '~ press in a spet.:ial (:Onsti tutional status 
~,~~-;·~· was labored and unconvincing. 
· . ,~· ..... ~ The interests at stake in the Stan-
,!;,.~::' ford case were broader than the press. 
;/~~. ?:~~rea:~~t~~~ se~~~~~~~e~~ se~:~·~ 
j~·f.~ may be unreasonable if. for no urgent 
.;•:": criminal Jaw need, it damages other 
· _;'; constitutional values: privacy, for ex-
,,;: . .- ample, or First Amendment rights. 
( :· J:'he major:ty in t!i::: Sta.:rorc' case 
tj ·:, did m:1ke the point that a magistrate, 
t;~ . in deciding whether to issue a warrant, 
f· . ,: must consider possible harm to the 
f.;,' First Amendment. Justice White, for 
~
r<; the Court, said: "Where the materials 
:;; sought to be seized may be proLected 
• , by the First Amendment, the require-
: :.:, ments of the Fourth must be applied 
:~ tJ' ' ·t exacti 
Justice Powell, in a concurring opin-
ion, put it even mo re strongly. A 
magistrate, he said, "should consider 
the valurs of a free press as well as the 
societal interest in enforcing :he 
criminal law." And in Jcciding 
whether to issue a search warrant, he 
should weigh "the magnitude of a pro-
posed l.Carch dm·cted at a~y th1rd 
party. together with the nnture and 
sign!ficancr of the matet ial sou ht." 
! ', 
·i'.;l . ,, 
., t·<· . ' ... ~·. 
1 1e anger 111 the Stanford case lay 
In the magnitude of the sea rch and irs 
in't ri!sive ql:ality. f'o!ic,• rummaged 
through files and rooms of the col!eg~ 
paper, seeking photographs of a 
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Such· a search may do rra I h·H tn nu~ 
o'nly to newspapers but to other "thin! 
parties"- pcr:;on<; who arr not tlv_' lll-
se lves suspcct(•d of any crime but are 
thought to have ('VIdence. The police: 
could go through the files of a psyLhia-
trist or a lawyer. And any sea rch 
through files is worrymg hera usc the 
documents sought arc l!kcly to be 
among others that the polJcc have no 
: right to take but wlil sec as they go by. 
· The Supreme (ourt majonty t rird to 
offer reassurance on those concerns. 
Justice White s::tid the requirement 
that search warr<lr.ts be specific, if 
..... 
ABROAD AT fiOME 
"properly a pplied , policed and ob· 
served," should prevent rummaring 
"Ctt large" rn newspaper fil rs. And 
"the rational prosecutor." he said, 
would use a subpoena when possible-
the procedure that The Stanford lJcu:y 
had wanted the Court to requu e, be-
cause it gives the party being searched 
a chance to object first. 
In reacting to the decision, newspa-
pers might have ueen wise to ;~mpha­
size those hel pful cautions to :n,Jgis-
trates and prosecutors mstr::<d of 
. crying havoc. If you tell the police that 
they have a blunderbuss weapon, they 
may well believe it. The t:1lk of a new 
threat to the press could become a self .. 
fulfilling prophecy. 
But whether the Court's caution<~ry ll· 
words will have much effect is in any _ 
case doubtful. The trouble is that those 
whose premises are to be searched ! • 
under a warrant are not told before-
lland. There is no hearing at which 
their lawyers can cite Supreme Court 
advice. And c.ll over the country 
magiJtrates are used t0 isouing search 
warrants .as a matter of routine, With-
out all tha t nice balancmg of interests. 
Because of the very dangers exem-
plified by the S\aaforcl cc.se, the 
American Law Institute put a ::;pecial 
procedure for documentary searches 
in its Model Pre-Arraignment Code. !f 
there is a risk of the sea; ching officer 
seeing unconnectcJ private papers, 
the code calls for an adversary hea r. 
ing when~ protections can be impcsed. 
That points to what was the real 
issue in the Staniord case: What are 
the constitutional means to protect n::>~ 
just newspapers but all Americans 
l, ;·;·.. from indiscriminate searches for evi-
l.,,· dence of somebody else's cranes'? Jus-
( ,..• tice Stevens, in a compelling S::!paratc 
1:):,_ dissent, noted that at the time the 
f.:-:~ Fourth Amendment was advpleu, pri-
r. vale papers were generally thought to 
~,':~,:·.· .. be immune from seizure altogether. 
f..:•; .. · The problem needs deeper considera. ~ 
!' .,, tion by the Court and oLhers, in a con-
•·:~ ~~.l ' . f..' ·.,: ·; _text broader than the press. : : 
·-~Ih:~~:::;.;\;;;:=~<.>:·~:··:·::. .. ~5:·~-· __ ·· _ --_· ~- ·-< ::_J- ,-:~:· .·~.:.:~ ~ 
